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Informal Governance of the United States
Edward Lee*
INTRODUCTION

A formalist account of a democratic government concentrates the
government in a body of elected officials, for example, Congress and the
President. Under this view, public governance is the responsibility of the
branches of government and government officials. Yet the Constitution
also recognizes an ideal of self-governance in “We the People.”1 How selfgovernance is achieved through an institutional government is a question
worthy of centuries of debate. Under one influential theory, selfgovernance is achieved by a representative or republican form of
government in which elected officials carry out the will of the people by
the laws the officials enact and policies they adopt, thereby furthering the
goal of self-governance.2 The elected officials are the representatives of
the people, and, by their consent, the officials must act in the people’s best
interest. If the representatives don’t, the people can vote them out.
Of course, this lofty ideal of self-governance is difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve in practice, particularly in a climate of polarization
and gridlock (not to mention high incumbency rates3), which continues to
give credence to the view of many Americans that our government is

* Professor of Law, Illinois Tech Chicago-Kent College of Law. Founder, The Free Internet
Project. Thanks to Hal Krent for invaluable feedback on the ideas in my article.
1. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 820–21, 821 n.31 (1995) (“Thus the Framers, in perhaps their most important
contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly responsible to the people, possessed of direct
power over the people, and chosen directly, not by States, but by the people.”).
2. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (“It is evident that no other form [of
government besides a republican form] would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of
America; with the fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination
which animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of
mankind for self-government.”).
3. See
Reelection
Rates
Over
the
Years,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/reelection-rates (last visited Apr. 19, 2022). High
incumbency rates make it difficult to bring change or reform in government.

199

BYU Journal of Public Law

[Vol. 36

broken.4 The conventional account of representative government also
ignores the possibility that self-governance is neither linear nor binary. It
may be far more dynamic and diffuse, based on complex relationships or
networks in which citizens periodically get involved in public governance
in ways beyond voting. “Governance,” in other words, may not be the
exclusive domain of the government; it does not have to operate from the
top down. Moreover, self-governance is not necessarily achieved by the
acts of the federal, state, or local governments. Instead, more fluid and
complex relationships of governance by people from the public and private
sectors may arise, especially in response to the failings of institutional
governments—of which there are many. This type of governing—informal
governance—is the focus of this Article.
This Article examines informal governance of the United States,
meaning situations in which informal governance occurs on a national
scale affecting all Americans. Take, for example, the informal group of
U.S. health experts self-described as the “Wolverines” (in a reference to
the 1980s movie Red Dawn, depicting World War III): they not only
foresaw the seriousness of the COVID pandemic, including asymptomatic
spread, in early January 2020 but also helped devise the U.S. response to
the pandemic, including social distancing and sheltering in place,
notwithstanding the Trump Administration’s meager efforts.5 Without the
Wolverines, the fate of the U.S. would likely have been far worse from a
public health standpoint. But the precise legal status of the Wolverines is
unclear. Although three members of the group held positions in federal
agencies, other members were from the private sector, academia, or
nonprofit organizations.6 In his book, Michael Lewis chronicles the
behind-the-scenes work of these physicians, who formed an informal
working group to respond to biological threats dating back to George W.
4. See, e.g., LEE DRUTMAN, BREAKING THE TWO-PARTY DOOM LOOP: THE CASE FOR
MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2020); KATHERINE M. GEHL & MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE
POLITICS INDUSTRY: HOW POLITICAL INNOVATION CAN BREAK PARTISAN GRIDLOCK AND SAVE OUR
DEMOCRACY (2020); LAWRENCE LESSING, THEY DON’T REPRESENT US: RECLAIMING OUR
DEMOCRACY (2019); see also Philip Elliott, Think the System Is Broken? You’re Not Alone, TIME (Mar.
31, 2021, 3:18 PM), https://time.com/5951631/pew-survey-faith-in-political-system/; David Frum,
The
American
System
Is
Broken,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
4,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/american- system-broken/616991/; Jacob S.
Hacker & Paul Pierson, The Republic Devolution: Partisanship and the Decline of American
Governance, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July–Aug. 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-0611/republican-devolution; David Rothkopf, Opinion, Our Government Is Broken. President Biden
Must Fix That., DAILY BEAST (Sept. 13, 2020, 4:55 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/ourgovernment-is-broken-president-biden-must-fix-that.
5. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE PREMONITION: A PANDEMIC STORY (2021).
6. Id. at 163–164.
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Bush’s Administration.7 Led by Dr. Carter Mecher, a senior medical
advisor for the Department of Veterans Affairs, the initial group of seven
physicians all had U.S. military experience except for Dr. Rajeev
Venkayya, who oversaw the creation of the National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza in Bush’s Administration.8 During the COVID
pandemic, the group enlisted two other notable experts: Dr. Charity Dean,
the assistant director of California’s Department of Public Health, and Joe
DeRisi, copresident of the Chan Zuckerberg Biohub, who developed the
Virochip, a computer chip containing the DNA sequences of every known
virus, and who developed a COVID test during the pandemic.9 By Lewis’s
account, the Wolverines helped save the United States from a worse fate
from the pandemic in spite of the failings of the Center for Disease Control
(CDC), the agency tasked with that important responsibility.10 Yet the
members of the Wolverines were acting as an unofficial, informal group—
or, as described in Lewis’s book, “this rogue group of patriots who were
working behind the scenes to save the country.”11
In prior scholarship, I have characterized the type of arrangement the
Wolverines embodied as a hybrid agency, one constituted by members of
both the public and the private sectors.12 In that article I called for the
formal creation of a hybrid agency as an oversight body to review appeals
of decisions by Google in the European Union regarding requests under
the EU right to be forgotten.13 What is different here is the informality of
the hybrid group. Although the Wolverines have existed for more than a
decade, their status is informal—more like an ad hoc, working group
involving members from government, the private sector, academia, and
nonprofits. What’s most intriguing about the Wolverines’ success is that
an informal working group might be better than a formal agency—indeed,
the federal government itself—in protecting Americans from a virus or

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 273–278.
10. Id. at 219; see also Jeneen Interlandi, Covid Proved the C.D.C. Is Broken. Can It Be Fixed?,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/16/magazine/cdc-covidresponse.html; Saad B. Omer, The CDC is Our Best Defense Against Pandemics. It Needs Reforms—
Now., WASH. POST (May 19, 2020); Jeffrey Koplan, Julie Gerberding, Richard Besser & Thomas
Frieden, The CDC Was Damaged by Marginalization and Politicization. This Is How Biden Can Fix
It, NBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2021, 2:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/cdc-was-damagedmarginalization-politicization-how-biden- can-fix-it-ncna1254135.
11. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 219.
12. Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to Be
Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1083–85 (2016).
13. Id. at 1085–86.
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biological threat. Lewis’s book suggests several reasons: the federal
government is inefficient and bureaucratic; federal employees work in
silos in which thinking outside the box is not allowed, much less rewarded;
the Trump Administration downplayed the virus and punted most of the
duties to the states; and the CDC had developed an institutional culture
that was paralyzed to act (without further studies), and it was headed by a
Trump political appointee.14 Yet, the informality of the Wolverines group
also raises serious concerns about its legitimacy, authority, and
transparency. The specter of a “shadow government” is one that looms
large in the background of informal governance and must be addressed.
That is not to say that the Wolverines were illegitimate, but it is important
to identify their status in a constitutional democracy.
Or consider the unlikely alliance between big businesses and labor,
Republicans and Democrats, who joined together to help preserve the
integrity of the 2020 U.S. election—to address the possible scenario of
President Trump losing the election but refusing to concede, which is
exactly what occurred.15 As Time Magazine details, “an informal alliance
between left-wing activists and business titans” formed to ensure free and
fair elections and recognition of the election results determined by the
states.16 On election day, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and AFL-CIO
issued a rare joint statement:
Although we may not always agree on desired outcomes up and down
the ballot, we are united in our call for the American democratic process
to proceed without violence, intimidation or any other tactic that makes
us weaker as a nation. A free and fair election is one in which everyone
eligible to cast a ballot can, all ballots are counted consistent with the
law and the American people, through their votes, determine the
outcome.17

For more than a year, the informal group worked on a variety of issues to
ensure the integrity of the election; for example, they helped secure
funding and information for states to administer secure voting in the
pandemic, they called upon social media platforms to address election
misinformation, and they enlisted a host of other groups (e.g., Issue One,
National Council on Election Integrity, Voting Rights Lab, and IntoAction)
14. See LEWIS, supra note 5.
15. See Molly Ball, The Secret History of the Shadow Campaign That Saved the 2020 Election,
TIME (Feb. 4, 2021, 5:40 AM), https://time.com/5936036/secret-2020-election-campaign/.
16. Id.
17. See AFL-CIO, Chamber of Commerce, National Faith Leaders Call for Votes to Be
Counted, AFL-CIO (Nov. 3, 2020), https://aflcio.org/press/releases/afl-cio-chamber-commercenational-faith-leaders-call-votes-be-counted.
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to provide public service announcements about the election to counter
misinformation.18 After the vote was counted, the informal group helped
organize the effort that led to a statement issued by 164 CEOs, including
Republicans, who called on Trump to concede.19 Although this informal
election group lacked a name, it achieved a massive effort involving many
actors, organizations, and businesses that aimed to protect the integrity of
the U.S. election. Similarly, to secure voting machines and software,
“federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, non-governmental, and private
sector partners nationwide worked together in unprecedented ways to
combat foreign interference efforts and support election officials, political
organizations, campaigns, and candidates in safeguarding their
infrastructure.”20 Christopher Krebs, the director of the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency and lifelong Republican, declared the 2020
election “the most secure in American history,” which led to his firing by
Trump, who continues to dispute the election result to this day.21
The alliance between Republicans and Democrats, business and labor,
to preserve the integrity of the 2020 U.S. election illuminates both the
promise and peril of informal governance. Given that the Constitution
leaves administration of federal elections to the states,22 facilitating
national coordination and information-sharing for election administration
among states, especially during a pandemic, were laudable goals. But
some conservatives questioned whether the informal group was civicminded as opposed to a “vast anti-Trump ‘conspiracy.’”23 The fact that the
Time Magazine article characterizes Mike Podhorzer, a progressive who is
a senior adviser to the president of the AFL-CIO, as the “architect” behind
the informal election group may contribute to at least the appearance that

18. See Ball, supra note 15.
19. See Jim Zarroli, CEOs Urge Trump to Concede: ‘Not a Moment to Waste’ in Fighting
COVID-19, NPR (Nov. 23, 2020, 2:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/23/938009930/ceos-urgetrump-to-concede-not-a-moment-to-waste-in-fighting- covid-19.
20. Joint Statement from the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security Assessing the
Impact of Foreign Interference During the 2020 U.S. Elections, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 16,
2021),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/03/16/joint-statement-departments-justice-and-homelandsecurity-assessing-impact-foreign.
21. Scott Pelley, Fired Director of U.S. Cyber Agency Chris Krebs Explains Why President
Trump’s Claims of Election Interference Are False, CBS NEWS (Nov. 30, 2020, 7:40 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/election-results-security-chris-krebs-60-minutes-2020-11-29/.
22. U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.”).
23. James Freeman, The Vast Anti-Trump ‘Conspiracy,’ WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2021, 2:50 PM
ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-vast-anti-trump-conspiracy-11612813840.
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the group had a partisan purpose to defeat Trump.24 But Time describes
several aspects of the effort that included Republicans joining Democrats,
such as through “the nonpartisan reform group Issue One,” to make public
statements about the importance of election integrity and respect for the
results after counting all the votes.25 Likewise, the Chamber of Commerce,
which has donated substantially to Republican campaigns,26 and CEOs of
big businesses who are Republicans—including Stephen Schwarzman,
CEO of the Blackstone Group, “one of Trump’s biggest financial
backers”—joined similar statements supporting election integrity or
asking for Trump to concede.27 Of course, Trump never conceded. But the
informal election group’s efforts weren’t for naught as they raised public
awareness about the need to respect the final election results in a
democracy.
This Article sets forth a theory to explain the constitutional status and
legitimacy of informal governance of the United States, while, at the same
time, identifying its limitations and possible abuses. Both the Wolverines
and the informal election group are examples of informal governance of
the United States—they convened to protect Americans from the COVID
pandemic and election interference. Informal governance describes
situations in which an informal group of actors, potentially from both the
public and private sectors, convene to address a problem or issue affecting
the public at large—e.g., public health, public safety, elections, etc.
Informal governance should be contrasted with political activism. Political
activism is a broad term that typically refers to efforts to organize in pursuit
of reforms through protests, campaigns, and often grass-roots efforts to
bring about political or social change.28 Political activism aims for change,
such as in government policies, whereas informal governance itself
involves activities that can be described as forms of governance.
Moreover, political activism typically is public and meant to draw the
public’s attention, whereas informal governance does not depend on
publicity. In fact, it may more commonly operate in secret.
This Article adds to the growing body of scholarship, especially from
outside the United States, devoted to exploring the benefits and limits of
24. See Ball, supra note 15.
25. Id.
26. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/
us-chamber-of- commerce/totals?id=D000019798.
27. See Ball, supra note 15; Zarroli, supra note 19.
28. See Brian Martin, Activism, Social and Political, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ACTIVISM AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 19 (Gary L. Anderson & Kathryn G. Herr eds., 2007),
https://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/07Anderson.html.
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informal governance.29 As other scholars have recognized, informal
governance may be the byproduct of a “surge of ‘wicked problems’ that
have prompted this type of leadership, as multiple actors come together to
solve policy problems.”30 Complicated problems may be too difficult for
traditional governments to solve. By contrast, informal governance may
be nimbler, more collaborative and interdisciplinary, and, ultimately, more
innovative at problem solving.31At the same time, informal governance
raises troubling legitimacy concerns and may itself be open to abuses. The
challenge is figuring out how to use informal governance best.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I outlines the features of
informal governance by studying the two examples of the Wolverines and
the informal election group as case studies. This Part identifies
characteristics of the type of informal governance embodied in these
examples: informal governance occurs when a group (1) lacking an
official delegation of authority to act, without formal status as a legal entity
or written rules to guide their actions, (2) convenes in a group or dynamic
network to address a major problem affecting the public at large, and (3)
renders decisions or actions that can be viewed as a form of governance
for the common good. The case studies demonstrate several potential
advantages of informal governance as a means of tackling complex,
intractable problems in a highly polarized political climate. Indeed,
informal governance may become essential when institutional
governments fail. Part II sets forth a theory to justify some forms of
informal governance as legitimate examples of self-governance, a
constitutionally protected power or endeavor reserved to the people under
the Tenth Amendment. It also traces the development of informal
governance back to perhaps the first major use of informal governance:
President George Washington’s establishment of the first cabinet, an
institution nowhere mentioned in the Constitution or then-existing federal
law. Part III discusses the potential abuses of and concerns raised by
informal governance, including lack of accountability, lack of
transparency, and possible corruption or outright illegality. Part IV

29. See, e.g., MAREIKE KLEINE, INFORMAL GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: HOW
GOVERNMENTS MAKE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WORK (2013); THOMAS CHRISTIANSEN &
CHRISTINE NEUHOLD, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON INFORMAL GOVERNANCE (2013); Andreas
Follesdal, et al., Informal Governance in the European Union: An Introduction, SSRN ELEC. J. (2004),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Abstract_id=1752191.
30. See Sarah Ayres, Assessing the Impact of Informal Governance on Political Innovation, 19
PUB. MGMT. REV. 90, 91 (2017) (discussing ERIK HANS KLIJN & JOOP KOPPENJAN, GOVERNANCE
NETWORKS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (2016)).
31. See id. at 90–91.
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proposes several measures to make informal governance more accountable
to the people.

I. I NFORMAL G OVERNANCE : T HEORY AND P RACTICE
Drawing upon the burgeoning literature, Part I defines informal
governance and outlines its central characteristics. The Part also applies
this understanding to two case studies involving the Wolverines’ response
group and the informal election group.
A. Definition and Characteristics of Informal Governance
In the twenty-first century, researchers from various disciplines,
ranging from anthropology to sociology to political science, have
produced a burgeoning literature on the use of informal governance in both
developed and developing countries.32 The concept has garnered
considerable attention in the European Union (EU), given the evolving
ways in which informal governance infiltrates EU governance.33 U.S. legal
scholars have not devoted as much attention to informal governance,
although the concept has been used episodically and perhaps more
expansively to include a wide range of private ordering.34
To understand what informal governance is, it may be easier to begin
with what it’s not. Formal governance “is regulated by rules that have been
instituted according to procedures recognized as legal in clearly defined
32. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 30; Aksana Imailbekova, Mapping Lineage Leadership in
Kyrgyzstan: Lineage Associations and Informal Governance, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ETHNOLOGIE 195
(2018); Anders Themnér & Mats Utas, Governance Through Brokerage: Informal Governance in
Post-Civil War Societies, 18 CIV. WARS 255 (2016); Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Practical Norms
and Informal Governance: The Origins of Endemic Corruption, 80 SOC. RSCH. 1135 (2013).
33. See sources cited supra note 30.
34. See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold & Resilience Just. Project Rsch’rs, Resilience Justice and
Community-Based Green and Blue Infrastructure, 45 WM. & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 665,
694 (2021) (“Co-governance is one of the forms of ‘hybrid’ or collaborative governance of green and
blue infrastructure, though some treat the term co-governance as a synonym for informal governance
and management through collaboration among multiple stakeholders.”); Juliet P. Kostritsky, A
Paradigm Shift in Comparative Institutional Governance: The Role of Contract in Business
Relationships and Cost/Benefit Analysis, 2021 WIS. L. REV. 385, 391 (2021) (“By studying the
preconditions for the success of informal governance in relational contracts, Macaulay led scholars to
see that firms could provide the same kind of information transmission through a party’s position in a
network, ‘reduc[ing] the need for firms to employ costly governance mechanisms.’”); Paula A.
Monopoli, Women, Democracy, and the Nineteenth Amendment, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1727, 1742 (2020)
(“We have long had tremendous gender disparity in the number of women who write op-eds and letters
to the editor, who are quoted as experts by the media, and who are selected as ‘talking heads’ on
television news shows. These are all forms of using one’s voice to participate in informal
governance.”).
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contexts.”35 Formal governance is easy to spot in the United States. For
example, President Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in 1970.36 The EPA has the authority to promulgate regulations to
protect the environment, but those regulations are subject to an elaborate
procedure, including notice and comment, under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).37 For everything, there are written (formal) laws,
regulations, and procedures. By contrast, informal governance has no
written rules or procedures.38 “Informal governance includes … structures
and processes that are un-codified, un-documented and have no trace
beyond the recollection and perceptions of the actors involved.”39 As such,
informal governance presents challenges for the public, critics, and
researchers because it is difficult to know even when informal governance
is occurring. It is not happening in plain view. Indeed, it may be
counterintuitive to think that, in a democracy, particularly the United
States, governance may occur informally, without any written laws or
regulations. Such a prospect raises obvious concerns about legitimacy, a
topic discussed below.
For the purposes of this Article, informal governance describes
situations in which an informal group of actors convene to address a
problem or issue affecting the public at large—e.g., public health, public
safety, elections, etc.—and render decisions or actions that affect the
public at large. The group is informal in the sense that no law specifically
delegates power to the group to undertake such actions, no law organizes
the group, and no written rules or procedures govern how the group should
act. Thus, unlike the EPA, an informal group is not created by statute and
is not subject to the APA. Nor is the group formalized as an organization,
such as a nonprofit, with written bylaws or charter. Moreover, the informal
group engages in governance when it performs functions that are intended
to address a problem or issue that affects the public at large, something

35. Michael Brie & Erhard Stölting, Formal Institutions and Informal Institutional
Arrangements, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON INFORMAL GOVERNANCE 19, 19 (Thomas
Christiansen & Christine Neuhold eds., 2012).
36. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966–1970), as reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §4321
(1994) and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970); see Mark A. Ryan, Abolishing the EPA?, 31 NAT. RES. & ENV’T
50, 52 (2016).
37. See Marc Melnick & Elizabeth Willes, Comment, Watching the Candy Store: EPA
Overfiling of Local Air Pollution Variances, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1993); Kelli Hayes, Sue and
Settle: Forcing Government Regulation Through Litigation, 40 U. DAYTON L. REV. 105, 115–18
(2015).
38. See Sarah Ayres, A Decentred Assessment of the Impact of ‘Informal Governance’ on
Democratic Legitimacy, 37 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. 22 (2020).
39. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
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that might be addressed by formal governance but for some reason is not.
Researchers have identified an additional characteristic of informal
governance: it is often facilitated by governance networks with the
inclusion of individuals from various sectors, including the government
and private sector.40 Such networks can result in greater collaboration,
cross-fertilization, and innovation and potentially enhance democratic
engagement with the inclusion of stakeholders and members of the public
in governance, an issue I return to later.41 Ultimately, informal governance
may open up the possibility for greater political innovation.
It is important to underscore that informal governance is not inherently
good (or bad). Much depends on the people involved and their motives.
Do they possess relevant expertise or qualifications to tackle the problem?
Are they dedicated to serving the common good instead of trying to benefit
themselves or their political party at the expense of others? Given the lack
of formal rules or procedures, informal governance, in the hands of the
wrong people, can easily devolve into corruption or a shadow government
as researchers have recognized.42 Yet, so too can formal governance. The
challenge is trying to identify the conditions or situations in which
informal governance might be particularly well-suited.
As other researchers have recognized, the level of informality or
formality of governance structures may be plotted along a spectrum, as
can other factors, such as how private or public the governance structures
are, how many people are affected by the governance (e.g., national, state,
or local), and how long the governance structures last. For example, a
government agency, which is an example of a formal governance structure,
could enlist private actors to address a specific problem on behalf of the
agency. The Obama administration’s recruitment of tech savvy
programmers from Silicon Valley—the so-called “tech surge”—to fix the
botched rollout of the government’s website (HealthCare.gov) for signing
up for health insurance under the Affordable Care Act provides a good
example.43 The Obama administration’s recruitment of tech people

40. Id. at 24–25.
41. Id.
INST.
ON
GOVERNANCE,
e.g.,
Informal
Governance,
BASEL
42. See,
https://baselgovernance.org/public-governance/informal-governance (describing how countries with
high levels of corruption may have formal laws and governance structures but are plagued by
corruption according to informal governance or unwritten rules) (last visited Mar. 27. 2022).
43. See David Morgan & John Whitesides, Obama Turns to Trusted Aide for “Tech Surge” to
Fix Healthcare Website, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2013, 8:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usahealthcare/obama-turns-to-trusted-aide-for-tech-surge-to-fix-healthcare-website-idUSBRE99K0
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eventually led to a formal unit within Executive Office of the President,
the U.S. Digital Service (USDS), which was intended to “institutionaliz[e]
the approach that saved the health care site and apply[] it to the work of
the government even before disaster strikes.”44 When the tech surge was
first created and only temporary, we might place its involvement in fixing
HealthCare.gov more toward the informal governance end of the
spectrum. But it evolved into a formal governance structure when the
USDS was created, going from about 12 technologists to a team of 180 in
2021.45
We should distinguish informal governance from (i) private
governance and (ii) private ordering. Although these concepts may
sometimes overlap, they are not equivalent. Private governance can be
informal, but it also can be formal, embodied in written rules and
procedures.46 Take, for example, the published content moderation
policies of internet platforms that govern what type of content the
platforms do not permit their users to post.47 The written policies, along
with the procedures the platforms have instituted to enforce them, are
private governance structures, yet they are not informal. Indeed, at least
today, they have become increasingly formal. For example, Facebook’s
establishment of an independent Oversight Body—a.k.a. Supreme
Court—for appeals of Facebook’s content moderation decisions is a
formal, private governance structure, with elaborate bylaws and rules.48
Informal governance is also different from private ordering. Private
ordering is a broad term that can involve both formal (e.g., written
contracts) and informal arrangements, as well as norms as the driver of the

M220131023; Robinson Meyer, The Secret Startup That Saved the Worst Website in America, THE
ATLANTIC (July 9, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/07/the-secretstartup-saved-healthcare-gov-the-worst-website-in-america/397784/.
44. Nancy Scola, White House Launches ‘U.S. Digital Service,’ with HealthCare.gov Fixer at
the Helm, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2014, 5:33 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/08/11/white-house-launches-u-s-digital-service-with-healthcare-gov-fixer-at-thehelm/.
45. See Matt Cutts, The Next Chapter for USDS, MEDIUM (Apr. 14, 2021),
https://medium.com/the-u-s-digital-service/the- next-chapter-for-usds-2eb6955065f3.
46. See, e.g., Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A Functional Typology of Private
Governance Institutions, 22 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y 67, 67 (2011) (“Private governance institutions
provide governance without government. They are rules and structures by which individuals,
communities, firms, civic organizations, and other entities govern their interests without the direct
involvement of the state or its subsidiaries.”); see Edward Lee, Moderating Content Moderation: A
Framework for Nonpartisanship in Online Governance, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 913, 928–30 (2021).
47. See Lee, supra note 46.
48. Id. at 1040.
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ordering.49 By contrast, informal governance does not involve a formal
arrangement, and it does not necessarily require norms as the driver of the
governance. Instead, people might convene and figure out a response to a
societal problem that lacks any preexisting norm on how to address it.
The other distinction to draw is between informal governance and civil
society. Civil society is a contested term,50 but it typically excludes the
government or state.51 Members of civil society, ranging from individuals
to nongovernmental organizations, can engage in self-governance in
various ways outside of the government.52 By contrast, informal
governance can involve groups composed entirely of government actors;
as we shall later discuss, the first example of informal governance of the
United States was President George Washington’s establishment and
reliance on a cabinet, which was not recognized by formal law. Informal
governance can overlap with civil society when all the actors involved in
informal governance are nongovernmental. But, as the two case studies
show, informal governance can involve more fluid relationships or
networks that include both governmental and nongovernmental actors.
These more fluid relationships can be described as informal governance
but not an example of civil society in a strict sense. More generally, the
litmus test for informal governance is different from civil society’s focus.
Informal governance examines the extent to which a governance
arrangement or practice lacks formal, written authority, organization, or
rules. The informality of the governance is key.
One final caveat: informal governance can be applied broadly to cover
a welter of situations in which people figure out how to conduct
themselves without formal rules. Under this broad conception, families
routinely adopt informal governance as a basic feature of their existence.
Probably few families codify the rules of the household—or when the kids
get grounded.
The focus of this Article, however, is on the situations of informal
governance that affect the public at large, especially in areas (e.g., public
health, safety, elections) in which governments no doubt have

49. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1257, 1260 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of
Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1132–35 (1997).
50. See Benny D. Setianto, Somewhere in Between: Conceptualizing Civil Society, 10 INT’L J.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 109, 109 (2007).
51. See Cynthia Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (2000).
52. See Miriam Galston, Civil Renewal and Regulation of Nonprofits, 13 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 289, 306–09 (2004).
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responsibilities. In other words, this Article seeks to examine when
informal governance arises to address a societal problem that governments
and formal governance structures are expected to address. I am most
interested in analyzing informal governance of the United States,
situations involving informal mechanisms that helped to shape governance
of the nation.
Why even discuss informal governance in the twenty-first century? At
least in the United States, we have a written constitution and a preference
for formal governance structures. (Other countries have dispensed with the
need for a written constitution, it is worth noting.53) Moreover, technology,
including the internet and blockchain, makes the promulgation of written
rules and recordkeeping trivially easy. Transparency of governance is vital
in a democracy. But informal governance can easily hide behind closed
doors. We will return to the legitimacy concerns in Part III. For now,
suffice it to say that informal governance is potentially problematic,
especially if it usurps government functions that require transparency. It
would be a mistake, however, to dismiss informal governance out of hand.
Researchers have suggested that informal governance might be a
byproduct of governments facing more complex or intractable problems,54
what Erik Klijn and Joop Koppenjan aptly describe as “wicked
problems.”55 Some complex problems are transnational or global, defying
an easy solution by a single country.56 And governments may have fewer
resources at their disposal following the global financial crisis to address
these problems.57 Professor Maarten Hajer characterizes the problem as an
“institutional void” involving established political institutions being
unable to address “pressing problems” on their own.58 To address these
problems, “new political spaces” emerge.59 In these political spaces, there
are no “generally accepted rules,” but instead, “discursive interactions.”60
Thus, as societal problems in the twenty-first century have become more
complex, intractable, and resistant to the approaches of formal

53. See Brian Christopher Jones, What’s So Great About a Written Constitution?, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/written-constitutions/616628/.
54. See Ayres, supra note 30, at 91.
55. ERIK H. KLIJN & JOOP KOPPENJAN, GOVERNANCE NETWORKS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
(2016).
56. See Maarten Hajer, Policy Without Polity? Policy Analysis and the Institutional Void, 36
POL’Y SCI.175, 175–76 (2003).
57. See Ayres, supra note 38, at 91.
58. See Hajer, supra note 56, at 175–76.
59. Id. at 176.
60. Id.
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governance, policymakers might need to turn to informal governance as
an alternative. Indeed, it may be the only option left.
B. Two Case Studies
The next section discusses two recent examples of informal
governance that occurred in the United States during the COVID
pandemic and the 2020 U.S. election. By using these two examples as case
studies, the Article provides a better understanding of informal
governance, why it occurred, how it occurred, how effective it was, and
whether we can identify any characteristics or factors that suggest when
informal governance might be better suited to address a societal problem.
1. The informal group of “Wolverines” and COVID-19
The first case study involves the Wolverines, the small group of
physicians and scientists from government, academia, and nonprofit
organizations that formulated the main strategy of community mitigation
or interventions (e.g., social distancing, closing of schools, bans on large
gatherings, and sheltering in place) in response to the COVID pandemic.
a. The magnitude of the problem

The COVID pandemic has presented a major public health problem
that is still raging around the world. By August 2021, the pandemic had
claimed the lives of an estimated 4.2 million people, including more than
630,000 people in the United States.61 Many commentators have compared
it with the 1918 pandemic, the deadliest pandemic of the twentieth
century.62 According to infectious disease experts, the H1N1 virus in the
1918 pandemic never really went away but continues to manifest itself in
various strains of flu, including the bird and swine flu.63 If the “end” of the
COVID pandemic is anything like the 1918 pandemic, as many experts
expect, the virus “will become endemic—meaning that it will continue to
circulate in pockets of the global population for years to come.”64 Even if
61. See COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLDOMETER (last visited Feb. 10, 2022).
62. See Radhika Chalasani, Photos: How the 1918 Flu and COVID-19 Pandemics Compare,
ABC NEWS (June 15, 2021, 12:17 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/comparing-contrastingcoronavirus-1918-flu-pandemics-images/story?id=71971264.
63. See Dave Roos, Why the 1918 Flu Pandemic Never Really Ended, HISTORY (Dec. 11,
2020), https://www.history.com/news/1918-flu-pandemic-never-ended.
64. Nicky Phillips, The Coronavirus Is Here to Stay—Here’s What That Means, NATURE (Feb.
16, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00396-2.
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vaccinations and treatments reduce the number of deaths of COVID and
severity of illnesses, it is fair to say that COVID presents a complex public
health problem globally that may persist indefinitely. On a ten-point scale
for rating complexity, with ten being the most complex, the COVID
pandemic would rank as a ten (if not higher).65
b. The failure or shortcoming of formal governance

The Centers for Disease Control was founded in 1946 by Dr. Joseph
Mountin, then under the name Communicable Disease Center. 66 It evolved
from the U.S. Public Health Service’s effort to control malaria.67 Today,
the CDC is a part of the Department of Health and Human Services.68 The
CDC describes itself as “[a]s the nation’s health protection agency” that
“conducts critical science and provides health information that protects
our nation against expensive and dangerous health threats, and responds
when these arise.”69 On its website, the CDC makes “a bold promise to the
nation . . . to save American lives by securing global health and America’s
preparedness, eliminating disease, and ending epidemics.”70 The CDC has
21,000 employees spanning all fifty states and more than fifty countries.71
By most accounts, the CDC performed poorly in addressing COVID.72
The CDC had trouble developing COVID tests and getting results in time
to help contain the spread of the virus.73 The CDC also initially advised
Americans not to wear masks74—a blunder that the CDC repeated when it
65. Cf. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 286 (recounting how D.A. Henderson, epidemiologist who led
the strategy on smallpox vaccines, criticized the simplistic, hindsight portrayal of Richard Neustadt in
The Swine Flu Affair of what Henderson characterized as a “complex decision-making process”).
66. See Our History – Our Story, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/about/history/index.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2022).
67. See The History of Malaria, an Ancient Disease, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/malaria/about/
history/index.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
68. CDC Organization, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/cio.htm (last visited
Mar. 27, 2022).
69. Mission, Role and Pledge, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/mission.htm
(last visited Mar. 9, 2022).
70. A Bold Promise to the Nation, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/about/24-7/index.html (last
visited Mar. 27, 2022).
71. See What Is the CDC and What Does It Do?, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.ajc.com/news/national/what- the-cdc-and-what-does/UlBH7SvtNyY0fk5iNc6BLO/.
72. See infra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
73. See Brett Murphy & Letitia Stein, The Coronavirus Test That Wasn’t: How Federal Health
Officials Misled State Scientists and Derailed the Best Chance at Containment, USA TODAY (Jan. 26,
2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2020/03/27/coronavirus-test-officialsbotched-rollout-derailed- containment/5080781002/.
74. See Elisabeth Buchwald, U.S. Health Officials Say Americans Shouldn’t Wear Face Masks
to Prevent Coronavirus—Here are 3 Other Reasons Not to Wear Them, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 2, 2020,
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revised its mask-wearing guidance in May 2021 and indicated that
vaccinated people do not need to wear masks indoors, but then returned to
advising the wearing of masks due to the Delta variant in July 2021.75
Lewis suggests that at least part of the reason for the CDC’s failures was
the failure of the Director Robert Redfield, a Trump appointee, to maintain
independence from the White House and avoid politicization of the
pandemic response.76 The Trump administration abdicated the
responsibility to the states to decide what to do to contain the spread of
COVID, while Trump himself downplayed the virus.77 The CDC was
plagued by an institutional culture that eschewed taking early actions that
might bring the CDC later blame.78 The CDC operated in the shadow of
its biggest public failure: in 1976, CDC Director David Sencer had called
for a national vaccination program based on a prediction of a possible
swine flu pandemic, given past cycles of the flu and the diagnosis of
several soldiers infected with the virus.79 Some people who were
vaccinated developed Guillain-Barre syndrome due to the vaccine, while
others experienced illnesses or died not necessarily from the vaccine.80 But
the CDC suspended the vaccination program, and no pandemic ever
materialized.81 The program was perceived as a fiasco and became subject
to a scathing book, The Swine Flu Affair, by Richard Neustadt and Harvey
Fineberg.82
12:47
PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-cdc-says-americans-dont-have-to-wearfacemasks-because-of-coronavirus-2020-01-30; Transcript for CDC Telebriefing: CDC Update on
Novel Coronavirus, CDC (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/t0212-cdctelebriefing-transcript.html.
75. See Apoorva Mandavilli, As Infections Rise, C.D.C. Urges Some Vaccinated Americans to
Wear Masks Again, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/27/health/covidcdc-masks-vaccines-delta-variant.html; Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, The C.D.C. Needs to Stop
Confusing the Public, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/04/opinion/cdccovid-guidelines.html.
76. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 279–80.
77. Id.; see Gabby Orr et al., Trump Tosses Coronavirus Shutdowns Back to the States,
POLITICO (Apr. 16, 2020, 7:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/16/trump-plan-forreopening-economy-191073; Michael D. Shear et al., Inside Trump’s Failure: The Rush to Abandon
Leadership Role on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/18/us/
politics/trump-coronavirus-response-failure-leadership.html; Stephen Collinson, Trump’s Stunning
Abdication of Leadership Comes as Pandemic Worsens, CNN (Nov. 12, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/12/politics/donald-trump-coronavirus-leadership/index.html; David A.
Graham, Trump Has Abdicated in the Face of Disaster, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 19, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/president-has-abdicated/617139/.
78. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 40.
79. Id. at 280–81.
80. Id. at 284.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 285.
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The CDC’s performance during the COVID pandemic had many
shortcomings. Trump’s own Coronavirus Task Force, which included
Redfield, Deborah Birx, Director of the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Disease Anthony Fauci, Surgeon General Jerome Adams, Jared
Kushner (Trump’s son-in-law), and others, worked behind-the-scenes to
provide guidance and recommendations to states.83 But, as the Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis and others have observed, Trump
appeared to undermine his own Task Force’s recommendations.84 The
existence of the Task Force itself provides further evidence that the CDC,
the federal agency whose mission is to protect Americans from epidemics,
did not fill the national leadership void left by the Trump Administration.85
Instead, it was filled by the Wolverines.86
c. The Informal Group or Network

The origin of the Wolverines traces back to a 2004 book about the
1918 pandemic, the creation of a government pandemic plan in 2005, and
a research article published in 2007 that debunked the conventional view
about the 1918 pandemic that social interventions failed to stop the spread
of the virus. In the summer of 2005, President George W. Bush read John
Barry’s book The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in
History.87 Bush was so alarmed about the possibility of another pandemic
that he convened a meeting of officials at the White House that included
Dr. Rajeev Venkayya.88 Bush wanted to know what the U.S. strategy was
to deal with a pandemic, but the only plan the government had was a
document from the Department of Health and Human Services advising

83. See Select Subcommittee Releases Eight Weeks of Coronavirus Task Force Reports Kept
Secret by the White House, SELECT SUBCOMM. ON THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://coronavirus.house.gov/news/press-releases/select-subcommittee-releases-eight-weekscoronavirus-task-force-reports-kept.
84. Id.; Joshua Cohen, President Trump Has Consistently Undermined White House
Coronavirus Task Force, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2020, 9:36 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuacohen/
2020/10/02/trump-has-perpetually-undermined-white-house-coronavirus-task-force/.
85. Lewis quotes a scathing letter sent by former CDC Director Bill Foege to Redfield in which
Foege stated: “Despite the White House spin attempts, this will go down as a colossal failure of the
public health system of this country. The biggest challenge in a century and we let the country down.
The public health texts of the future will use this as a lesson on how not to handle an infectious disease
pandemic.” LEWIS, supra note 5, at 280.
86. See Matthew Mosk et al., As Coronavirus Threatened Invasion, A New “Red Dawn” Team
Tried to Save America, ABC NEWS (July 28, 2020, 3:05 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/
coronavirus-threatened-invasion-red-dawn-team-save-america/story?id=72000727.
87. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 50.
88. Id. at 51.
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“to speed up the production of vaccines and stockpile antiviral drugs.”89
Bush was unimpressed, saying, “[t]his is bullshit.”90 A new plan would be
created, and Dr. Venkayya was tasked with drafting it.91 In less than two
weeks, Dr. Venkayya finished a draft. The first plan was written at a high
level of generality.92
With a plan completed, Bush secured from Congress $7.1 billion for
shoring up the country’s neglected pandemic strategy.93 Dr. Venkayya then
had the responsibility of assembling a team to draft a more detailed plan
to respond to a pandemic. He obtained approval to hire seven people from
federal agencies94 and sought out candidates who were “quick learner[s],
good teammate[s], trusted by the top brass inside their agencies,” and
“outside the box” thinkers.95 Two of the members Dr. Venkayya recruited
were Dr. Richard Hatchett, who then was doing research at the National
Institutes of Health unrelated to pandemics, and Dr. Carter Mecher from
the Department of Veterans Affairs.96 Drs. Hatchett and Mecher were
assigned the responsibility of drafting chapter 6, “the strategy for
minimizing illness and death[s].”97 The team completed the plan titled
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, which was more detailed than
the first plan but was still pretty general.98 It did tersely mention the need
to “[p]rovide guidance to all levels of government on the range of options
for infection-control and containment, including those circumstances
where social distancing measures, limitations on gatherings, or quarantine
authority may be an appropriate public health intervention.”99
Serendipity also led Drs. Hatchett and Mecher to Bob Glass, a scientist
at Sandia National Labs.100 Mecher was dating Bob Glass’s sister. On a
visit to her aunt, Laura Glass, the daughter of Bob Glass, described her
science fair project to Mecher: she and her father had created a model with
a computer program to show how social interventions (e.g., closing

89. Id. at 52.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 53.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 53.
95. Id. at 59.
96. Id. at 58–60.
97. Id. at 75–76.
98. HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (Nov. 2005),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-strategy-2005.pdf.
99. Id. at 8.
100. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 81.
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schools) could stop or slow the spread of a virus.101 Mecher suggested to
Laura Glass that she should write an article and try to publish her
findings.102 When Bob Glass learned of the encounter, he emailed Mecher
a draft of a paper about the science project that all the journals he had sent
it to had rejected.103 Mecher then investigated the issue of social
interventions during the 1918 pandemic. With Glass’s model and periodic
help, the research assistance of Lisa Koonin, a CDC staffer, and statistical
analysis of Harvard epidemiologist Marc Lipsitch, Mecher and Hatchett
debunked the conventional wisdom about the ineffectiveness of social
interventions in the 1918 pandemic.104 Contrary to the then-prevailing
wisdom, such interventions did not fail during the 1918 pandemic. Based
on an empirical analysis of interventions used in seventeen cities, the
researchers showed that the key was the timing of the public health
interventions—they had to come early, before the wide spread of the
virus.105 Their article created quite a stir. By 2020, it became the eighth
most cited article in the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences.106 But for months after its publication, government and public
health officials remained skeptical.107 Drs. Hatchett and Mecher eventually
convinced the skeptics through meetings and lectures culminating in a key
December 11, 2006 conference attended by “[p]ublic health officers from
around the country … along with assorted big shots from the private sector
and academia.”108 The CDC enlisted them to draft a revision to its
pandemic strategy to include recommendations for social distancing,
school closures, and bans on large gatherings, depending on the severity
of the virus.109 It marked a monumental shift in thinking about pandemic
strategy among U.S. public health officials.110
The collaboration and close working between Hatchett and Mecher
were the genesis of what evolved into the Wolverines. Before discussing
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 96–103.
105. See Richard J. Hatchett, Carter E. Mecher & Marc Lipsitch, Public Health Interventions
and Epidemic Intensity During the 1918 Influenza Epidemic, 104 PNAS 7582, 7583–84 (2007).
106. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 81.
107. Id. at 105–08.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 108.
110. As Lewis recounts Koonin’s reflection on the shift: “There was the CDC way of doing
things. . . . It was vaccinate and isolate. And this wasn’t that.” Id. at 99. According to Lewis, “No one
in the CDC was thinking about how, in the event of a deadly pandemic, the government might move
people apart from each other in this way or that.” Id.
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the group, it is worth pausing and discussing the dynamic way in which
Hatchett and Mecher eventually reached their key insight of social
interventions discussed in their paper. First, credit should be given to Dr.
Venkayya for recruiting “outside the box” thinkers to work on the
pandemic plan, particularly the chapter on mitigation he assigned to Drs.
Hatchett and Mecher. What is striking about all of the researchers who
contributed to the new thinking on the use of social interventions during a
pandemic, which went against years of accepted wisdom of the CDC and
public health officials, is the relative lack of specialization and expertise
in epidemiology, infectious disease, or pandemics among key members of
the group at the time. Hatchett trained in internal medicine and did a
fellowship in oncology;111 when Venkayya recruited him, Hatchett was
working on research related to cancer treatment through radiation (in the
event of a nuclear war).112 Mecher was a specialist in internal medicine
and critical care, who was a senior medical advisor for the VA’s Office of
Public Health after having served as its Chief Medical Officer for the
Southeast VA Network.113 Koonin was the only one with a master’s degree
in epidemiology and a doctor of public health; at the CDC, she was a lowlevel staffer who had been working on developing guidance for businesses
(e.g., to promote health among their employees) and had only recently
been assigned the task of creating a checklist of items for businesses to
prepare for a pandemic.114 Glass was a scientist at Sandia National Labs,
which was created in the 1940s to conduct research related to nuclear
weapons.115 Hatchett, Mecher, and Koonin enlisted the help of Harvard
epidemiologist Lipsitch for the statistical analysis, plus the credibility of a
scholar to publish in a science journal.116
Another key characteristic of the group was the lack of any formal
government relationship or assignment that motivated their research.
Hatchett and Mecher were driven to continue their research on the
pandemic after they had already written the chapter included in the
government’s national pandemic strategy.117 They spent long hours,

111. See Leadership, CEPI, https://cepi.net/about/whoweare/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2020) (bio
for Richard Hatchett, CEO).
112. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 58.
113. See Carter Mecher MD, PUB. HEALTH CO., https://www.phc.health/team-member/cartermecher-md (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
114. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 96.
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id. at 103.
117. Id. at 87.
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beyond the normal work day, pursuing their research.118 When Koonin was
enlisted to help with the research, she did so at night after her CDC work
“without the knowledge of her superiors at the CDC.”119 She worried about
whether they would approve and asked the others to keep it confidential.120
Lipsitch thought it was “fun” and perhaps “a bit off-the-wall” to be invited
to join their research paper.121 The working relationship of the group
resembles more the kind of informal relationship that researchers in
academia routinely form when collaborating on a paper than the kind of
bureaucratic arrangement one expects in government. It also may have
some similarity with a start-up mentality of working long hours to pursue
a new, disruptive idea.122
From 2008 to 2020, the administrations changed from Bush to Obama
to Trump. Dr. Venkayya had left government before the end of Bush’s
tenure.123 Mecher remained in the White House for the Obama
administration.124
The informal group of Wolverines initially involved seven physicians
who periodically exchanged emails to discuss biological threats to the
United States:
(1) Dr. Carter Mecher, senior medical adviser for the VA;
(2) Dr. Richard Hatchett, Chief Executive Officer of the Coalition for
Epidemic Preparedness Innovations;
(3) Rajeev Venkayya, who had become President of the Global
Vaccine Business Unit at Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Ltd.;
(4) Dr. Matt Hepburn, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Biological Technologies Office, who ultimately led vaccine
development for the Trump administration’s Operation Warp
Speed;
(5) Duane Caneva, Chief Medical Officer of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS);
(6) James Lawler, Associate Professor, Department of Internal
Medicine, Director, International Programs and Innovation,
118. Id.
119. Id. at 102.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 103.
122. See Julie Bort, The Unwritten Rules of Working at a Startup That No One Likes to Talk
About, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 1, 2016, 3:40 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-unwritten-rulesof-working-at-a-startup-2016-8.
123. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 112.
124. Id.
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Global Center for Health Security, Director, Clinical and
Biodefense Research; and
(7) Dave Marcozzi, Assistant Chief Medical Officer for Acute Care;
Associate Chair of Population Health & Community Outreach,
University of Maryland School of Medicine.
Later, during the COVID pandemic, the group enlisted the
participation of (8) Dr. Charity Dean, a disease control expert, and the
assistant director of California’s Department of Public Health,125 and (9)
Joe DeRisi, copresident of the Chan Zuckerberg Biohub and creator of the
viro-chip.126
Although the group apparently did not have a formal chair, Mecher
was the driving force behind the group, according to Lewis’s book.127 As
Caneva, the chief medical officer of the Department of Homeland Security
described, “[m]ost of our calls start off with, ‘Carter, what are you
thinking?’ . . . He’s like a savant on all this stuff.”128 The group’s emails
and their conference calls eventually included other government officials,
including Anthony Fauci, other members of the president’s coronavirus
task force, and White House staffers, although their identities were not
always disclosed on the calls.129 In effect, the federal government’s
COVID policy was being shaped by more than one network of experts and
officials. The Wolverines were one, fairly closely-knit network that
interacted with other networks that included, for example, Dr. Fauci and
members of the coronavirus task force. The complex relationship might be
characterized as one involving “polycentric networks of governance,” to
borrow Hajer’s terminology.130 Because we lack information on all that
happened behind the scenes in the federal government during the
pandemic, it is impossible to lay out every network. For example, Dr.
Fauci and Dr. Birx were perceived as important figures during the
pandemic, but identifying their precise roles and influence in shaping the
federal strategy to COVID requires further information that is not yet
public.131 As a result, this review can only be partial.
125. See Charity Dean MD, MPH&TM, PUB. HEALTH CO., https://www.phc.health/teammember/charity-dean-md-mph-tm-2 (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
126. See Joe Derisi, Ph.D, CZ BIOHUB, https://www.czbiohub.org/people/leadership/joe-derisiph-d/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
127. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 5, at 209–10.
128. Id. at 165.
129. Id. at 209–10.
130. See Hajer, supra note 56, at 175.
131. But see Damian Paletta & Yasmeen Abutaleb, Anthony Fauci’s Pandemic Emails: ‘All Is
Well Despite Some Crazy People in This World,’ WASH. POST (June 1, 2021),
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d. The Contributions of the Wolverines to Governance

Led by Dr. Mecher, the Wolverines were pivotal in advancing the view
that social interventions (e.g., social distancing, school closings, sheltering
in place, and bans on large gatherings) should be adopted early to stop the
spread of COVID.132 Although the CDC had accepted that fundamental
shift in thinking from its past rejection of social interventions, the CDC’s
guidance it provided to the public was often less definitive in endorsing
social interventions in 2020.133 The CDC was almost paralyzed to act. As
Dr. Caneva, the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) described the internal meetings in January and February
2020, “[t]he CDC kept saying the response would be data-driven, but they
weren’t getting any data. And any data they got was going to be a lagging
indicator. They were calling the shots, and we needed someone else to call
the shots.”134 In March 2020, the CDC deferred to the states on whether
people should even get tested for COVID and whether people should
shelter in place.135
That led the Wolverines to seek an alternative to the federal
government to act more swiftly to contain COVID. The plan was simple:
convince a state to adopt social interventions that could become a model
for other states to follow.136 On Feb. 6, 2020, Dr. Caneva emailed Dr.
Charity Dean in California; the two had a prior encounter and
disagreement over the Trump Administration’s flying of Mexican
immigrants from Texas to California.137 But Dr. Caneva trusted Dr. Dean
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/tony-fauci-emails/; Monica Alba, Birx
goes on the road to push her pandemic message, NBC NEWS (Sep. 15, 2020, 11:19 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/birx-goes-road-push-her-pandemic-messagen1241085.
132. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 5, at 183–84.
133. See, e.g., Interim Guidance: Get Your Mass Gatherings or Large Community Events Ready
for
Coronavirus
Disease
2019
(COVID-19),
CDC
(Mar,
12,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/Mass-Gatherings-Document_FINAL.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200316000741/https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/downloads/Mass-Gatherings-Document_FINAL.pdf]; Considerations for School Closure, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/considerations-for-school-closure.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200313043517/https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/downloads/considerations-for-school-closure.pdf]; see Dawn Kopecki, CDC Recommends
Canceling Events with 50 or More People for the Next Eight Weeks Throughout US, CNBC (Mar. 15,
2020, 7:35 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/16/cdc-recommends-the-cancellation-of-eventswith-50-or-more-people-for-the-next-eight-weeks-throughout-us.html.
134. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 184.
135. See Dennis Evanosky, Stay-at-Home Order Extended to May, ALAMEDA SUN (Mar. 31,
2020), https://alamedasun.com/news/stay-home-order-extended-may.
136. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 185.
137. Id. at 185–86, 190.
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enough to call her to enlist her help.138 As Dr. Dean recounted in Lewis’s
book, Dr. Caneva had said, “he belonged to this small, informal, almost
secret group of doctors who had once worked in the White House under
Bush or Obama and were now scattered to the winds but not without
influence.”139 Dr. Caneva asked for her help “in getting what this secret
group of doctors had to say to the governor of the nation’s most populous
state so that it might take the lead for the country, as the White House
clearly was not going to.”140 Dr. Dean wondered if what Dr. Caneva was
doing was illegal but concluded that it probably wasn’t.141 But, from her
perspective, Dr. Caneva was working “without the White House’s
permission, to coordinate some kind of national pandemic response.”142
Dr. Dean even felt that not only Dr. Caneva could get into serious trouble
but so could she.143 Yet Dr. Dean still joined the Wolverines.144
Enlisting Dr. Dean into the Wolverines can be viewed as adding a new
hub to the network the Wolverines had formed. As a hub, Dr. Dean had
connections to the California state government that the other Wolverines
lacked. Yet, at least in February 2020 when she first joined, Dr. Dean
lacked the kind of pull or authority within the state government the
Wolverines had envisioned.145 To the contrary, Dr. Dean’s boss, Sonia
Angell, the Director of the California Department of Public Health who
had worked for the CDC, “banned” Dean “from using the word ‘pandemic’
and told her to erase the math and tsunami curve on her whiteboard” that
Dean had used to predict the rapid number of deaths that would occur in
the pandemic.146 Even some members of President Trump’s coronavirus
task force were counting on Dr. Dean’s help. According to Lewis’s book,
Ken Cuccinelli, the acting deputy secretary of homeland security,
reportedly told her she “need[ed] to push these things through” because
she’s “the only one who can do this.”147 On March 6, 2020, Governor
Gavin Newsom convened a hundred state officials to develop a strategy
for COVID.148 Angell told Dean not to attend the meeting because she had

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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“no role” there, but, according to Dean, Angell conveniently backed out of
the meeting that morning and asked Dean to attend in her place.149 At the
meeting, Dr. Dean gave a twenty-minute presentation laying out the
expected numbers of infections in the pandemic she had calculated and
possible public health responses; she answered questions from Newsom
and others for forty-five minutes.150 From that point forward, Dr. Dean had
the attention of high-level officials in California.151 In August 2020, Angell
unceremoniously resigned as Director for Public Health due to a reported
“tech glitch” that resulted in the undercounting of COVID infections in the
state.152
As a hub in the network linking the Wolverines to California’s state
government, Dr. Dean quickly increased her connections within
California’s state government following the March 6, 2020 presentation to
Newsom. By mid-March, 2020 Newsom’s technology adviser Mike
Wilkening enlisted Dr. Dean to another informal group, one that the
Governor created.153 Newsom called Todd Park, a prominent entrepreneur
who had served as President Obama’s chief technology officer and who
had successfully founded three health care technology companies, to help
the state figure out a response to the coronavirus.154 Park drafted two other
Obama administration alums, Dr. Bob Kocher, now a venture capitalist,
and DJ Patil, the federal government’s first chief data scientist.155 Patil then
recruited “some of the best programmers in Silicon Valley and the team
instantly began to collect data that would help them project and predict.”156
They all worked as volunteers.157 Park asked Wilkening for the state’s
“most kick-ass public health guru.”158 Wilkening said it was Dr. Dean.
At the mid-March 2020 meeting, Dr. Dean gave her analysis of the
expected spread of COVID, with a comparison to the 1918 pandemic.159
She conveyed some of the insights she obtained in working with the
Wolverines, particularly Dr. Mecher’s modeling analysis, although she did
149. Id. at 226.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 227–28.
152. See Emily Hoeven, CA Director of Public Health Resigns, CAL MATTERS (Aug. 10, 2020),
https://calmatters.org/newsletters/whatmatters/2020/08/sonia-angell-resigns-department-of-publichealth-newsom/.
153. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 230.
154. Id. at 229.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 230.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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not mention the group or her involvement with Park and Patil.160
Impressed by her presentation, Park described Dr. Dean as the “L6,”
meaning she was the “person buried under six layers of organization
whose muzzled voice suddenly, urgently needed to be heard.”161 Park and
Patil concluded that they would be most helpful to the state by translating
Dr. Dean’s analysis into a model—or, in Park’s words, “to take everything
in her brain and get it to the governor.”162 And that’s what Park’s team did.
On March 18, 2020, they presented to Newsom’s senior advisers a new
model with projections about the spread of COVID, hospitalizations, and
deaths, with and without social interventions.163 Social interventions
would reduce deaths to a tenth of the number of deaths without
interventions.164 The model alarmed Newsom’s advisers.165 The next day,
Governor Newsom announced a stay-at-home order for California, the
first in the country.166 Within just two weeks, forty-two other states
(twenty-four with Democratic governors and nineteen with Republican
governors) issued stay-at-home orders.167 The Wolverines’ plan worked.
Of course, the stay-at-home orders drew vocal protests, such as in
Michigan where protesters stormed the state capitol armed with guns.168
But studies of the COVID responses support the effect of such orders in
slowing the spread of the virus.169 Additional studies may shed further light
on the efficacy of social interventions, including stay-at-home orders,
mask wearing, social distancing, school closures, and bans on large
160. Id.
161. Id. at 231.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 232.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See States That Issued Lockdown and Stay-at-Home Orders in Response to the
Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/States_that_issued_lockdown_and_stay-athome_orders_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020 (last visited Mar. 27,
2020).
168. See, e.g., Katelyn Burns, Armed Protesters Entered Michigan’s State Capitol During Rally
Against Stay-at-Home Order, VOX (Apr. 30, 2020, 9:04 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2020/4/30/21243462/armed-protesters-michigan-capitol-rally-stay-at-home-order; Abigail
Censky, Heavily Armed Protesters Gather Again at Michigan Capitol to Decry Stay-At-Home Order,
NPR (May 14, 2020, 10:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/14/855918852/heavily-armedprotesters-gather-again-at-michigans-capitol-denouncing-home-order.
169. See, e.g., Yevgeniy Feyman, Effectiveness of COVID-19 Shelter-in-Place Orders Varied by
State, PUBMED.GOV (Dec. 31, 2020), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33382849/; Amanda Moreland
et al., Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19 Stay-at-Home Orders and Changes in Population
Movement—United States, March 1–May 31, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1198
(Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6935a2.htm.
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gatherings. It may well be that, with the benefit of hindsight and such
studies, countries rethink their deployment of social interventions for
future pandemics. In the United States at least, most of the social
interventions faced some opposition from segments of the population,
particularly among people who supported Trump. Moreover, “pandemic
fatigue” may diminish the public’s willingness to return to stay-at-home
or school closures. Finally, one strategy that Mecher and the Wolverines
apparently did not seriously consider was universal masking without
lockdowns (as Japan adopted during the pandemic170). Notably, in their
study of the 1918 flu, Hatchett and Mecher were not able to determine the
effect of mask ordinances that were implemented in “only . . . a small
number of cities, or . . . only late in the epidemic.”171 Future studies should
investigate whether universal masking without lockdowns during the
COVID pandemic was effective.
For our purposes, it is not crucial to decide whether the Wolverines’
recommendations for social interventions to address the pandemic proved
to be wise or correct. The political controversy over using social
interventions is likely to last as long as COVID does. Instead, it is to
understand the difference in approach to governance the Wolverines
embodied. Table 1 below depicts the main differences between the formal
governance of the CDC and the informal governance of the Wolverines.

170. See Yasutoshi Nishimura, Opinion, How Japan Beat Coronavirus Without Lockdowns,
WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2020, 7:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-japan-beat-coronaviruswithout-lockdowns-11594163172.
171. Hatchett et al., supra note 105.
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T ABLE 1. C OMPARISON B ETWEEN C ENTERS FOR D ISEASE
C ONTROL AND W OLVERINES
CDC

Wolverines

Head

Political appointee

No political appointee and
no official head but de
facto leader

Total
members

10,639 people in
2018

Seven people initially,
expanded to nine

Composition

Fixed, with federal
government
employees

Dynamic and evolving,
with federal and state
government employees,
academics, and corporate
employees

Approach

Slow, wait for more
studies and data

Urgent, need to act swiftly
with social distancing,
shelter in place, closing
schools before community
spread

Governance

Formal

Informal

As indicated above, the CDC is headed by a political appointee of the
President.172 The CDC director used to be a civil servant position, selected
without regard to party politics.173 But that changed during the Reagan
Administration, when the position was changed to a political appointee.174
According to Lewis’s account, the change occurred because the White
House wanted to control scientific or medical studies that could be
172. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 289.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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sensitive to President Reagan’s political base and source of campaign
contributions, such as research related to AIDS or aspirin.175 Lewis
contends that the change created a turnover problem at the top and a lack
of management experience: “the average tenure of the [CDC] appointees
fluctuated between eighteen months and two years.”176 It also created a
potentially worse problem: the political appointee selected was often
expected to serve “the White House’s political operation” and to defer to
the White House.177 Trump’s CDC Director Redfield lacked experience
heading an agency and lasted about two years until the end of Trump’s
term.178 During the pandemic, Redfield was not a prominent figure in the
public communications of the president’s coronavirus task force, although
he did advise the importance of social distancing on Christian conservative
radio.179 According to Politico, Trump’s political appointees at the
Department of Health and Human Services, Michael Caputo and Paul
Alexander, emailed Redfield to pressure the CDC to write its Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Reports (MMWR) in a light more favorable to
Trump; Alexander’s email even instructed Redfield to stop the weekly
reports so that Alexander could personally review them before they were
published, a request that went against the professional norms and practices
of the CDC.180 Redfield later reportedly instructed his staff to delete
Alexander’s email, in possible violation of federal record-keeping law.181
In contrast with the CDC, the Wolverines, as an informal group, had
no official head or political appointment. By Lewis’s account, Carter
Mecher was the de facto leader of the group.182 Mecher had been the chief

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 290.
178. Julia Belluz, The New CDC Director Was Once Accused of Research Misconduct, VOX
(Mar. 22, 2018, 9:59 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/3/22/17150322/robert-redfield-cdc-directortrump; Debra Goldschmidt, Dr. Robert Redfield Appointed CDC Director, CNN (Mar. 21, 2018, 5:47
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/21/health/redfield-cdc-director- bn/index.html.
179. See Darius Tahir, How the CDC Director Became the MAGA Whisperer on Coronavirus,
POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2020, 2:19 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/09/cdc-director-robertredfield-coronavirus-176247.
180. See Dan Diamond, Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19, POLITICO
(Sept. 12, 2020, 11:11 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusive-trump-officialsinterfered-with-cdc-reports-on-covid-19-412809 (“[MMWR] reports have historically been published
with little fanfare and no political interference, said several longtime health department officials, and
have been viewed as a cornerstone of the nation’s public health work for decades.”).
181. See Dan Diamond, CDC’s Redfield Told Staff to Delete Email, Official Tells House
Watchdog, POLITICO (Dec. 10, 2020, 2:40 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/10/cdcredfield-email-house-watchdog-444238.
182. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 165.
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medical officer for the VA Southeast Network in Atlanta.183 In October
2005, the VA selected Mecher as its representative to fulfill the Bush White
House’s request for an “outside the box” thinker.184 That led to Mecher’s
involvement in the drafting of Bush’s pandemic plan.185 Mecher served as
the Director of Medical Preparedness Policy at the White House
Homeland Security Council and National Security Staff.186 Mecher stayed
in that position during the first term of the Obama administration and then
returned to the VA as a senior medical adviser.187 The role gave Mecher
considerable freedom to decide his own agenda.188 During Trump’s
administration, Mecher had no role in the White House or Homeland
Security, but he, along with Richard Hatchett, Rajeev Venkayya, and four
other doctors who had worked with Mecher when he was at Homeland
Security, continued to follow and discuss biological threats in a small
group known as the Wolverines.189 What is striking about the Wolverines
is their lack of partisanship. The fact that Mecher could work for both the
Bush and the Obama White House speaks volumes.
Two members of the group were part of the Trump administration: Dr.
Hepburn, Vaccine Lead for Operation Warp Speed; and Dr. Caneva, Chief
Medical Officer of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).190
Although Hepburn and Caneva were political appointees, the Wolverines,
as an informal group, appeared to be somewhat insulated from political
pressure from the White House. The fact that six members of the group
had prior experience in the military, which prohibits soldiers from
engaging in partisan political activities,191 is also noteworthy.192 As
Mecher described, “We weren’t doing this for the federal government. We
were doing it for each other.”193
Another advantage of the Wolverines was its innovative ethos. As
explained above, the informal group operated a dynamic network enlisting
183. See PUB. HEALTH. CO., supra note 113.
184. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 74.
185. Id. at 74–75.
186. See PUB. HEALTH. CO., supra note 113.
187. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 160–61.
188. Id. at 161–62.
189. Id. at 163–64.
190. See Mil. Health Sys. Commc’ns Off., Hepburn: DOD Role in Operation Warp Speed Was
‘Transformative,’ HEALTH.MIL (Dec. 11, 2020), https://health.mil/News/Articles/2020/12/11/
Hepburn-DOD-role-in-Operation-Warp-Speed-was-transformative; Duane Caneva, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/person/duane-caneva (last updated July 17, 2021).
191. LEWIS, supra note 5, at 163–64.
192. Id. at 163.
193. Id. at 175.
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other experts, such as DeRisi and Dr. Dean, as needed. The dynamic nature
of the group enabled it to benefit from expertise not only in the federal
government, but also in state government, nonprofits, and the private
sector. The Wolverines operated more like a startup company to address
biological threats. Mecher and Hatchett were able to rethink decades of
conventional wisdom about the 1918 pandemic and efficacy of social
interventions by carefully examining the data related to interventions used
in the 1918 pandemic (though with insufficient data on universal masking
without lockdowns, as noted above).194 Their findings emphasized the
importance of the timing of social interventions—they must be early or
they would be too late.195 Mecher had started tracking the novel
coronavirus reported in China on approximately January 9, 2020.196
Mecher scoured the internet for all available data on reported COVID
cases and deaths in China and elsewhere, and compiled a spreadsheet with
rough projections of the spread of COVID based on a comparison with the
SARS virus of 2003.197 Mecher knew that the reported cases belied the
magnitude of spread, in China, the United States, and other countries.198
In early February 2020, Mecher had already flagged the asymptomatic
spread of COVID and lack of testing of asymptomatic individuals.199 In an
email to the Wolverines in early 2020, Mecher lamented the CDC’s lack
of testing and the federal government’s lack of urgency to stop the spread
of the “fire.”200
By contrast, the CDC in 2020 had become a sprawling, bureaucratic
agency with an institutional culture that tended to avoid proactive
measures to fight a pandemic, especially if they were not in line with the
White House’s agenda or could lead to the kind of political fallout that
occurred in 1976, when the CDC had instituted a national vaccination
program for a swine flu pandemic that never materialized.201 If the
Wolverines operated like a startup, the CDC was more like a multinational
corporation set (or stuck) in its own ways.202 To draw an analogy, the
Wolverines were Tesla, while the CDC was GM. According to an
investigative report by USA Today, based on “42,000 pages of emails and
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See supra text accompanying note 171.
See Hatchett et al., supra note 105.
LEWIS, supra note 5, at 164–65.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 169–70.
Id. at 180–81.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 283–84.
See generally CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 61–63 (rev. ed. 2003).
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memos obtained from health departments and interview[s with] more than
100 community leaders and public health experts, including current and
former CDC officials,” the CDC downplayed the seriousness of the
COVID virus in January through April 2020.203 “[P]aralyzed by
bureaucracy, [the CDC] failed to consistently perform its most basic job:
giving public health authorities the guidance needed to save American
lives during a pandemic.” As USA Today recounts, state “[h]ealth officials
flooded the CDC with hundreds of phone calls and emails. Many questions
went unanswered. In other cases, the agency response amounted to you
decide.”204
It goes beyond the scope of this Article to conduct a full review of the
CDC’s response to the pandemic. By most, if not all, accounts, the CDC
failed on multiple levels, including its botched test kits,205 initial public
recommendation against masks,206 guidance against testing asymptomatic
persons and lack of recognition of asymptomatic spread,207 and early
downplaying of the spread and seriousness of the virus and overall lack of
national leadership in fighting COVID.208 The Wolverines operated
within—and perhaps in response to—the leadership vacuum created by
the CDC’s lack of national leadership. In April 2022, Biden’s CDC
Director, Dr. Rochelle Walensky, announced the CDC was undertaking a
review to figure out how to revamp and modernize the structure of the
agency, which many had criticized during the pandemic.209
Of course, the kind of aggressive social interventions the Wolverines
recommended were not free of controversy. The shelter-in-place orders
and school closures especially drew intense objections from

203. See Brett Murphy & Letitia Stein, How the CDC Failed Public Health Officials Fighting
the Coronavirus, USA TODAY NEWS (Jan. 26, 2021, 4:02 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/news/investigations/2020/09/16/how-cdc-failed-local-health-officials-desperate-covidhelp/3435762001/.
204. Id.
205. See Murphy & Stein, supra note 73.
206. See Buchwald, supra note 74.
207. See Will Feuer, CDC Quietly Revises Coronavirus Guidance to Downplay Importance of
Testing
Asymptomatic
People,
CNBC
(Aug.
26,
2020,
5:28
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/26/cdc-quietly-revises-coronavirus-guidance-to-downplayimportance-of-testing-for-asymptomatic-people.html; LEWIS, supra note 5, at 176 (discussing how
Redfield ordered no COVID testing of 57 Americans repatriated from Wuhan).
208. See sources cited supra note 10.
209. Lena H. Sun, CDC, Under Fire for Covid Response, Announces Plans to Revamp Agency,
POST,
(Apr.
4,
2022,
6:45
PM),
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/04/04/walensky-cdc-revamp-pandemic/.
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predominantly Trump supporters.210 California Governor Newsom was
subject to an unsuccessful recall vote, “the result of a political uprising
largely driven by angst over state coronavirus orders that shuttered schools
and businesses and upended life for millions of Californians.”211
Moreover, future studies of the COVID pandemic should evaluate the
efficacy and respective tradeoffs of lockdowns versus universal masking
without lockdowns. Assuming the social interventions the Wolverines
recommended saved American lives, we must still examine whether the
influence of an informal group in shaping what turned out to be the
strategy adopted by forty-three states should be viewed as a legitimate
exercise of informal governance, a question analyzed in Parts II and III.
2. Informal election group during the 2020 U.S. election
The second case study involves the informal election group or network
that formed to protect the integrity of the 2020 U.S. election.212 As Time
Magazine describes the group:
The handshake between business and labor was just one component
of a vast, cross-partisan campaign to protect the election—an
extraordinary shadow effort dedicated not to winning the vote but to
ensuring it would be free and fair, credible and uncorrupted. For more
than a year, a loosely organized coalition of operatives scrambled to
shore up America’s institutions as they came under simultaneous attack
from a remorseless pandemic and an autocratically inclined President.
Though much of this activity took place on the left, it was separate from
the Biden campaign and crossed ideological lines, with crucial
contributions by nonpartisan and conservative actors. The scenario the
shadow campaigners were desperate to stop was not a Trump victory. It
was an election so calamitous that no result could be discerned at all, a
failure of the central act of democratic self-governance that has been a
hallmark of America since its founding.213

210. See Toluse Olorunnipa et al., Rallies Against Stay-at-Home Orders Grow as Trump Sides
with Protesters, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ralliesagainst-stay-at-home-orders-grow-as-trump-sides-with-protesters/2020/04/17/1405ba54-7f4e-11ea8013-1b6da0e4a2b7_story.html; Grant Smith & Chris Kahn, Despite Scattered Protests, Most
Americans Support Shelter-in-Place, Reuters/Ipsos Poll Shows, REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2020, 4:17
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-poll/despite-scattered-protests-most-americanssupport-shelter-in-place-reuters-ipsos-poll-shows-idUSKCN22336P.
211. See Michael R. Blood & Kathleen Ronayne, California Sets Date for Recall Election
Targeting Newsom, AP NEWS (July 1, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/california-governor-gavinnewsom-recall-a2326a90364bf7ce502fa9f8e64532e9.
212. See Ball, supra note 15.
213. Id.
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a. The magnitude of the problem

The informal election group sought to protect the integrity of the U.S.
election. In 2020, two special problems arose. First, a pandemic was still
raging, so measures would need to be taken to ensure people could vote
safely.214 But the bigger problem: the possibility that President Trump
would not accept the election results if he lost.215 That fear had been
festering since the 2016 presidential debate with Hillary Clinton in which
Trump refused to commit to accepting the election results in a response to
a question by Chris Wallace, which he asked Trump because he had
already declared that the election was rigged even before Election Day.216
In response, Clinton warned:
You know, every time Donald thinks things are not going in his
direction, he claims whatever it is is rigged against him. He lost the Iowa
caucus. He lost the Wisconsin primary. He said the Republican primary
was rigged against him. Then Trump University gets sued for fraud and
racketeering; he claims the court system and the federal judge is rigged
against him. There was even a time when he didn’t get an Emmy for his
TV program three years in a row and he started tweeting that the awards
were rigged against him.217

During the 2020 campaign against Joe Biden, Trump again refused to
commit to accepting the election results, this time in an interview with
Wallace.218 The informal election group’s fear of what would happen if
Trump refused to accept the election results turned out to be justified. Even
after Congress certified the election results declaring Biden the winner,
following a failed insurrection by Trump supporters on the Capitol to stop
the certification on January 6, 2021 that resulted in several deaths, plus
many failed legal challenges by Trump to contest the election results in
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See PBS Newshour, Trump on Whether He’ll Accept the Election Outcome, YOUTUBE
(Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lXysnUQwy6U; Sarah Wheaton, Clinton Mocks
Trump for Saying Emmys are Rigged, POLITICO (Oct. 19, 2016, 10:25 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/trump-emmys-rigged-2016-debate-230039;
Patrick
&
Jonathan Martin, Donald Trump Won’t Say if He’ll Accept Result of Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/us/politics/presidential-debate.html.
217. See Rebecca Speare-Cole, Hillary Clinton’s 2016 Warning That Trump Always Claims
System Is Rigged When Losing Watched 3 Million Times, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 6, 2020, 8:24 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/hillary-clinton-warning-trump-system-rigged-against-him-video-20161545463.
218. See Will Feuer, President Trump Won’t Agree to Accept 2020 Election Results as Biden
Leads in Polls – ‘I Have to See,’ CNBC (July 20, 2020, 3:39 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/19/
president-trump-wont-agree-to-accept-2020-election-results-as-biden-leads-in-polls.html.
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swing states, Trump still hasn’t accepted the election results of the 2020
election.219 Many Trump supporters even believe he will be restored as the
rightful President.220
b. The failure or shortcoming of formal governance

Unlike the pandemic itself, for which the federal government had
prepared the outline of a national strategy under the Bush administration,
the federal government had no plan or playbook for how to vote safely
during a pandemic, let alone for how to handle a losing incumbent
candidate who simply refused to accept the final election results.
Election administration for federal elections in the United States is
notoriously bad.221 The main challenge is that, even for federal elections,
election administration is balkanized. There is no uniformity. Nearly
everything is left to each state to decide under its own system of balloting,
voting technology, and counting and recounting methods.222 States can
even delegate the responsibility to different localities, producing even
more balkanization.223 This decentralized approach creates many different
election systems, state by state, if not county by county.224 The Elections
Clause in the U.S. Constitution contemplates that the states bear the
primary responsibility of prescribing “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” but it also allows
Congress to “at any time by Law make or alter such [state] Regulations.”225
For the most part, Congress has deferred to the states. In 2002,
Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which created the
219. See Don Gonyea, Trump Yanks Endorsement of Alabama Senate Candidate Brooks, Who
Said to Get Past 2020, NPR (Mar. 23, 2022, 4:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2022/03/23/1088264503/
donald-trump-mo-brooks-withdraws- alabama-endorsement; Todd J. Gillman, CPAC: Donald Trump
Spins Tales of Rigged Election, Papers Over Jan. 6 Riot, Hints at 2024 Comeback, DALL. MORNING
NEWS (July 11, 2021, 3:22 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2021/07/11/cpacdonald-trump-spins-tales-of-rigged-election-papers-over-jan-6-riot-thrills-conservatives/.
220. See Jerry Davich, Opinion, Column: The Latest Conspiracy: Trump is Returning as
President on Thursday. Friday’s Reality Won’t Dissuade His Zealots., CHIC. TRIB. (Mar. 2, 2021, 2:43
PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/opinion/ct-ptb-davich-march-4-president
-trump-return-to-office-conspiracy-st-0-20210302-tsgglzszxbggtl2ssnli3ixnxa-story.html.
221. See Anthony J. Gaughan, Ramshackle Federalism: America’s Archaic and Dysfunctional
Presidential Election System, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1021, 1031–33 (2016).
222. Id. at 1031–32.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators.”).
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U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), “an independent, bipartisan
commission charged with developing guidance to meet HAVA
requirements, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and serving as
a national clearinghouse of information on election administration.”226 In
March 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act (CARES Act), which included $400 million for state grants
to pay for COVID precautions.227 The EAC also served as a clearinghouse
for best practices in COVID precautions during the election, which
included information from the CDC, Homeland Security, and several
states.228 But, according to Time, the $400 million in state grants wasn’t
nearly enough.
An even larger problem than the decentralization of election
administration was the possibility that the 2020 election results would not
be accepted by Trump, a concern that raised fears of violence. The Twelfth
Amendment lays out, in great detail, the process for determining who is
President based on the votes of the Electors from each state.229 But neither
the Constitution nor federal law speaks to what happens if the losing
candidate simply refuses to accept the election results but continues to
contest it even after Congress has certified the vote. In the past, norms or
customs helped to ensure the finality of the election results. Dating back
to 1896 with William Jennings Bryan’s concession to Republican William
McKinley, every presidential candidate who lost the election accepted the
results and conceded.230 However, people feared that Trump would never
accept the results if he lost. That possibility presented a problem that
formal governance did not address.
c. The Informal Election Group or Network

The informal election group or network was much larger than the
close-knit Wolverines. Although there may have been a core group of
people, the Time Magazine article describes a very loose collection of
contributors from various sectors who got involved in different aspects of
226. See About the U.S. EAC, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, https://www.eac.gov/
about-the-useac (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
227. See 2020 Cares Act Grants, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, https://www.eac.gov/
payments-and-grants/2020-cares-act-grants (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
228. See Coronavirus (COVID-19) Resources, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N,
https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/coronavirus-covid-19-resources (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
229. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
230. Amy McKeever, No Modern Presidential Candidate Has Refused to Concede. Here’s Why
That Matters, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 8, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/
article/no-modern-presidential-candidate-refused-to-concede-heres-why-that-matters.
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the efforts to preserve election integrity. For simplicity, I will refer to the
contributors as the informal election group, with the caveat that the group
was embodied by various groups, networks, and individuals working on
election issues. The Time article does not identify every member that
contributed to the informal election network, so the information available
is incomplete. Listed in Table 2 below are the names of the individuals and
nonprofits that contributed to the efforts that the election group helped to
organize, with political leaning where self-identified.

T ABLE 2. I NDIVIDUALS AND E NTITIES C ONTRIBUTING TO
I NFORMAL ELECTION G ROUP
Name

Self-identified
political leaning

Chamber of Commerce

Nonprofit

AFL-CIO

Nonprofit

Issue One

Nonprofit

22 Democrats and 22 Republicans on the National Council on
Election Integrity

Bipartisan

Protect Democracy with bipartisan election task force

Nonprofit

Fight Back Table

Democrat

Democracy Defense Coalition

Democrat

Analyst Institute

Progressive

Planned Parenthood

Nonprofit

Greenpeace

Nonprofit

Indivisible

Progressive

MoveOn

Progressive

Chan Zuckerberg Initiative

Nonprofit

National Vote at Home Institute

Nonprofit

Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights

Nonprofit

Voter Participation Center

Nonprofit

All Voting Is Local

Nonprofit
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Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights

Nonprofit

Voting Rights Lab

Nonprofit

IntoAction

Nonprofit

“Protect the Results” coalition

150 liberal groups

Detroit Will Breathe

Nonprofit

Fems for Dems

Democrat

We the People Michigan

Nonprofit

Voter Protection Program

Nonprofit

Progressive data geeks and strategists

Progressive

Representatives of donors and foundations

Not provided

State-level grassroots organizers

Not provided

Racial-justice activists

Not provided

Mike Podhorzer
Zach Wamp

Democrat
Republican

Dick Gephardt

Democrat

Anat Shenker-Osorio

Democrat

Maurice Mitchell
Amber McReynolds, National Vote at Home Institute

Progressive
Not provided

Tom Lopach, Voter Participation Center

Democrat

Hannah Fried, All Voting Is Local

Democrat

Vanita Gupta, president and CEO of the Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights
Laura Quinn, a veteran progressive operative who co-founded
Catalist
Nelini Stamp, the Working Families Party’s national
organizing director
Neil Bradley, the Chamber of Commerce’s executive vice
president and chief policy officer
Chamber of Commerce CEO Thomas Donohue

Democrat

AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka
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Progressive
Progressive
Republican
Republican
Democrat
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Heads of (i) National Association of Evangelicals and (ii)
National African American Clergy Network
Angela Peoples, director for the Democracy Defense Coalition

Not provided
Progressive

Art Reyes III

Democrat

Mike Rogers

Republican

John Engler

Republican

Rick Snyder

Republican

Jennifer Granholm
Richard Primus, a law professor at the University of Michigan
Norm Eisen

Democrat
Not provided
Democrat

There was no formal head to the election group. However, Mike
Podhorzer, senior adviser to the president of the AFL-CIO, is described by
the Time Magazine article as the “architect” behind much of the group’s
effort.231 In March 2020, Podhorzer drafted a three-page memo that
detailed what he perceived to be the “[t]hreats to the 2020 Election.”232
With clairvoyance, the memo predicted: “Trump has made it clear that this
will not be a fair election, and that he will reject anything but his own reelection as ‘fake’ and rigged. On November 3, should the media report
otherwise, he will use the right-wing information system to establish his
narrative and incite his supporters to protest.”233 Podhorzer’s memo
identified four potential problems: “[A]ttacks on voters, attacks on
election administration, attacks on Trump’s political opponents and
‘efforts to reverse the results of the election.’”234 In April 2020, Podhorzer
began holding weekly Zoom meetings with hundreds of people from
progressive circles.235 As Time described, “[t]he meetings became the
galactic center for a constellation of operatives across the left who shared
overlapping goals but didn’t usually work in concert. The group had no
name, no leaders and no hierarchy, but it kept the disparate actors in
sync.”236 The network expanded to include Republicans, the Chamber of
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

See Ball, supra note 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Commerce, and big businesses, especially in the efforts to instill respect
for the voting and counting process, and the ultimate election results.237
d. The contributions of the informal election group or network to informal
governance

The informal election group was different from the Wolverines, not
only in terms of size but also in terms of its strengths or contributions to
governance. The informal election group was less about innovation. There
was no novel rethinking of decades’ worth of policy or administration.
Instead, the election group was more about national organization and
coordination to fill two big gaps: (1) a shortfall in funding for COVIDrelated precautions during voting and (2) the lack of a formal mechanism
to respond to a candidate’s refusal to accept the election results or
desperate attempts to reverse the results through whatever means.238
First, “[l]ed by the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights,
more than 150 organizations signed a letter to every member of Congress
seeking $2 billion in election funding.”239 After Congress allocated less
than half the amount needed, donations from private foundations,
including the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, filled the gap.240 In addition, the
National Vote at Home Institute, a nonprofit, “helped 37 states and D.C.
bolster mail voting.”241 Meanwhile, “[n]ational civil rights groups worked
with local organizations to get the word out that [in-person voting] was the
best way to ensure one’s vote was counted.”242 In Philadelphia, “‘voting
safety kits’ containing masks, hand sanitizer and informational brochures”
were distributed.243
Second, the informal election group developed a strategy to respond
to Trump’s unfounded claims that mail-in voting would lead to voter
“fraud like you’ve never seen”244 and that the election was rigged. After
the election was over and the results in, Attorney General William Barr
disputed Trump’s allegations and said the Attorney General found no such

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Nicholas Riccardi, Here’s the Reality Behind Trump’s Claims About Mail Voting, AP NEWS
(Sept. 30, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-joe-biden-election-2020-donald-trumpelections-3e8170c3348ce3719d4bc7182146b582.
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evidence.245 Or, as Barr put it, “[i]t was all bullshit.”246 Yet Trump never
conceded the election, much less stopped his claims that the election was
rigged. This is a gap or shortcoming in formal governance. Beyond the
century-old tradition of losing presidential candidates conceding to the
victor, there is nothing to keep losing candidates from trying to undermine
the election results and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the person elected.
As Noah Feldman explains, concessions are important to maintaining the
legitimacy of democracy and renouncing “open resistance” to the election
results.247 If a candidate can just claim the election was “rigged” and have
his supporters believe it, then the overall faith in democracy is likely
diminished.
The informal election group used multiple tactics to try to instill
respect in the election results. During and after the counting of votes, the
group undertook several initiatives. (1) “They executed national publicawareness campaigns that helped Americans understand how the vote
count would unfold over days or weeks, preventing Trump’s conspiracy
theories and false claims of victory from getting more traction.”248 For
example, the group explained how the “blue shift” from counting mail-in
ballots would likely shift the vote count toward Democrats.249 On Election
Day, U.S. Chamber of Commerce CEO Thomas J. Donohue, National
Association of Evangelicals President Walter Kim, AFL-CIO President
Richard L. Trumka and National African American Clergy Network CoConvener Dr. Barbara Williams-Skinner issued a rare joint statement to
instill respect for the process.250 The nonprofit Issue One and its bipartisan
National Council on Election Integrity, composed of twenty-two
Republicans and twenty-two Democrats, “launched the ‘Count Every
Vote’ campaign, a $15 million public effort to defend the legitimacy of our
elections, call for patience from the American electorate while every vote
is counted, and advocate for state and local election officials to have more
245. See Jemima McEvoy, Bill Barr Says He Suspected Trump’s Election Fraud Claims Were
‘Bullsh-t’ from the Start, FORBES (June 27, 2021, 10:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jemimamcevoy/2021/06/27/bill-barr-says-he-suspected-trumps-election-fraud-claims-were-bullsh-tfrom-the-start/?sh=1260543f46eb.
246. See Jonathan D. Karl, Inside William Barr’s Breakup With Trump, THE ATLANTIC (June
27, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/06/william-barrs-trump-administrationattorney-general/619298/.
247. See Noah Feldman, Opinion, Why Losing Candidates Should Concede, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
21, 2016, 11:34 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-10-21/why-losingcandidates-should-concede.
248. See Ball, supra note 15.
249. Id.
250. See AFL-CIO supra note 17.
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support to hold safe and secure pandemic elections.”251 Likewise, “[t]he
Voting Rights Lab and IntoAction created state-specific memes and
graphics, spread by email, text, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and TikTok,
urging that every vote be counted.”252 (2) As the votes were being certified
in the key battleground state of Michigan, activists mobilized in person at
the state canvassing board and on social media to emphasize “their
message of respecting voters’ wishes and affirming democracy rather than
scolding the officials.”253 (3) “Hundreds of major business leaders, many
of whom had backed Trump’s candidacy and supported his policies, called
on him to concede.”254 (4) On January 6, 2020, the group advised everyone
to stand down and not attempt to respond to the violent Trump supporters
who stormed the Capitol.255
How successful the informal election group was in instilling respect
for the election results is debatable. Trump never conceded but continued
to call the election “rigged” even as late as April 2022,256 more than a year
after Biden was inaugurated President on January 20, 2021. Some Trump
supporters, including Sen. Josh Hawley who challenged the certification
of votes for Biden in the Senate on January 6, admitted that Biden is the
“duly-elected President.”257 However, according to an April 2021 poll,
“60% of Republicans . . . believe Trump’s claims that Biden’s win was due
to widespread voter fraud despite a lack of credible evidence.”258 Then
again, perhaps without the informal election group’s efforts to promote
election integrity, the number of people who believe the election was
somehow rigged would be even higher.

251. See Protecting Elections: Our Work for Safe, Secure, and Transparent Elections, ISSUE
ONE, https://www.issueone.org/election-integrity/ (last visited July 20, 2021).
252. See Ball, supra note 15.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Dave Boucher et al., Trump Hammers at False Claims of Voter Fraud in Return to
Michigan, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Apr. 2, 2022, 11:25 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics
/2022/04/03/donald-trump-holds-rally-macomb-county/7208593001/; see also Eleanor Dearman,
Trump Repeats Call for a Border Wall, Says Election ‘Rigged’ at CPAC Speech in Dallas, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM (July 11, 2021, 9:36 PM), https://www.star-telegram.com/news/politics-government
/article252714878.html.
257. See Steph Bazzle, WATCH: Josh Hawley Forced to Admit on the Record “Joe Biden is the
Legitimately-Elected POTUS,” HILL REP. (July 16, 2021), https://hillreporter.com/watch-joshhawley-forced-to-admit-on-the-record-joe-biden-is-the- legitimately-elected-potus-107016.
258. See Alison Durkee, More Than Half Of Republicans Believe Voter Fraud Claims And Most
Still Support Trump, Poll Finds, FORBES (Apr. 5, 2021, 9:59 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
alisondurkee/2021/04/05/more-than-half-of-republicans-believe-voter-fraud-claims-and-most-stillsupport-trump-poll-finds/?sh=39f40ccf1b3f.
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3. Advantages of informal governance
These two case studies suggest several potential advantages of
informal governance. First, in times of national crisis or emergency,
informal governance may be more responsive to the particular problem the
country faces. Precisely because of its lack of formality or predefined
contours, informal governance is nimbler and more innovative in tackling
or responding to the problems at hand. In other words, the informal
governance can be designed or adapted to fit the specific needs presented
by a pressing problem. The right people can be enlisted in an evolving
network to address the problem. The network can enable collaboration,
cross-fertilization across different disciplines and areas of expertise, and
creative, “outside the box” thinking. Informal governance may also be
better suited to addressing a gap or shortcoming of formal governance,
whether due to the complete absence of any formal governance to address
the problem (e.g., respecting the ultimate election results) or due to the
abdication or failures of formal governance (e.g., the Trump
administration’s and CDC’s abdication of pandemic responses to the
states). Finally, informal governance may foster nonpartisanship or
bipartisanship among those involved, not only because it operates outside
of existing bureaucracies and entrenched partisanship, but also because the
success of the informal governance may depend on putting aside purely
partisan interest. The Wolverines based their recommendations on medical
science and what they believed to be the best way to fight the spread of the
coronavirus. Even if social interventions were politically controversial, the
Wolverines weren’t making their recommendations based on politics. The
informal election group enlisted both Republicans and Democrats to join
the effort to promote respect for the election results in a democracy. Critics
may disagree with their approaches and methods, but their respective goals
of trying to save lives in a pandemic and to protect election integrity
against efforts to undermine the final result should be unassailable.

II. A T HEORY OF I NFORMAL G OVERNANCE AS S ELF-G OVERNANCE
This Part addresses the legitimacy question for informal governance
and sets forth a theory to explain informal governance as expanding
opportunities for self-governance.
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A. The Legitimacy Question for Informal Governance
Can informal governance be legitimate in the United States, with so
much primacy given to a written constitution and the rule of (written) law?
More generally, “[c]an informal governance ever be legitimate?”259 At first
blush, the answer seems to be no. As Mareike Kleine aptly put it:
An intuitive answer to this question is probably no. The term informality
reminds one of smoke-filled backrooms, mobsters, and illicit business. It
holds an aura of the covert, exclusive, if not illegal, all of which is
difficult to square with the ideal of a democratic process that is inclusive,
deliberative, and transparent. Informality, it seems, is the symptom of a
pathological political order whose legitimacy is eroding.260

However, this conventional wisdom masks indiscriminate uses of the
term “informal governance.”261 Scholars have attempted to show that, at
least in some circumstances, informal governance can be legitimate.
Kleine offers three scenarios in which informal governance may be
legitimate: (1) when it enhances the participation of citizens with a deep
interest in the issue who otherwise would have been ignored (i.e., input
legitimacy), (2) when it enables politicians to be persuaded by better
arguments (i.e., throughput legitimacy), and (3) when it allows
governments “to achieve a level of cooperation that would otherwise be
unsustainable” (i.e., output legitimacy).262
But, as Kleine notes, informal governance is always susceptible to
“manipulation and abuse.”263 Informal governance is fraught with the
potential to become anti-democratic because “informal processes avoid
accountability requirements—they are not officially coded, making it
difficult to provide assurances of transparency, accountability, and
legitimacy.”264 Yet scholars also recognize that informal governance can
promote “creativity and innovation” in policymaking, at least in the short
term,265 and “might . . . be employed as a tool to complement formal
institutional arrangements and rules—essentially ‘greasing the wheels’ of

259. Mareike Kleine, Informal Governance and Legitimacy in EU Politics, EUROPEAN U. INST.
1, 2 (2018), https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/56645/KLEINE_IG_and_legitimacy.pdf?
sequence=2&isAllowed=y.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 13.
263. Id.
264. See Ayres, supra note 38, at 27.
265. Id.
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the formal bureaucracy.”266 Therefore, it is important to institute
“additional mechanisms” to “help all governments distinguish between
legitimate and nonlegitimate demands for a more accommodating
treatment of each other.”267
Much of the literature on informal governance focuses on practices in
the EU. Perhaps this focus should not be surprising given the EU’s more
recent creation in 1993 and continued evolution. The EU is a unique
political system involving twenty-seven member states.268 It is open to
question whether the same justifications would necessarily apply in the
United States, which may give greater primacy to a written constitution
and formal governance.
B. Informal Governance and Self-Governance
This section makes the case for why some forms of informal
governance should be considered legitimate forms of self-governance.
1. Historical practice of informal governance of the United States
The starting point is the first example of informal governance of the
United States. President George Washington routinely relied on informal
advisers, including John Jay as well as government officials he consulted
by letters not “officially” but in an “informal manner.”269 Even more,
Washington’s establishment and utilization of the first Cabinet can itself
be viewed as a form of informal governance, perhaps the first example for
the newly formed United States. Washington appointed four department
heads: Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of Treasury
Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of War Henry Knox, and Attorney General
Edmund Randolph.270 The Constitution does not speak to, much less,
create a Cabinet.271 All that Article II says is that the President “may
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the duties of their
266. Id.
267. Kleine, supra note 259, at 13.
268. See generally Introduction: The EU – A Political System, but not a State, CARLETON,
https://carleton.ca/ces/eulearning/politics/introduction-the-eu-a-political-system-but-not-a-state/ (last
visited Mar. 27, 2022).
269. See E. Garrett West, Note, Congressional Power Over Office Creation, 128 YALE L.J. 166,
190–91, 222–23 (2018).
270. LINDSAY CHERVINSKY, THE CABINET: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND THE CREATION OF AN
AMERICAN INSTITUTION, 5 (2020).
271. Id.
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respective Offices.”272 Read as a limitation or as a part of an exclusive list
of enumerated powers, the clause might suggest that the President is
limited to written advice of the department heads and can consult them on
matters only relating to “the Duties of their respective Offices.”273
Washington, however, found this power far too limited. Instead of
merely soliciting writings, halfway into his presidency, he convened
meetings with his department heads as a Cabinet and consulted with them
on matters beyond the duties of their respective offices, as historian
Lindsay Chervinsky documents in her recent book The Cabinet.274 These
first Cabinet meetings were not expressly authorized by the Constitution
or any federal law.275 Washington established the practice and what
became a presidential institution known as the Cabinet. He “embraced
frequent cabinet meetings as a central part of executive practice.”276
a. The magnitude of the problem

As we have already seen with the two case studies, informal
governance arose due to a shortcoming of formal governance in
responding to national problems. Notably, Washington formed a Cabinet
in response to several national crises. In the first two years of presidency,
Washington did not have a Cabinet. But, when possible war with France
and Great Britain and a domestic insurrection arose, Washington
extensively relied on his Cabinet.277 As Chervinsky recounts:
So where did the cabinet come from? Washington designed the
cabinet to provide advice and support during crucial diplomatic crises
and constitutional conundrums. He did not enter the presidency
intending to create the cabinet, and he explored many alternatives before
establishing this new institution. In fact, Washington did not convene the
first cabinet meeting until November 26, 1791—more than two and a
half years into his administration. Yet as he grappled with the threat of
international invasion, domestic insurrection [the Whiskey Rebellion],
and challenges to presidential authority, Washington became convinced
that the options outlined in the Constitution were insufficient to get the

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
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job done. The first cabinet developed organically in response to these
governing challenges.278

b. The failure or shortcoming of formal governance

This early historical example of informal governance of the United
States supports the modern theory that informal governance arises in the
face of intractable problems that defy easy solution by formal governance.
Of course, Washington could have tried to resolve all the national crises
on his own without the formation of a Cabinet. But he did not. When the
national crises mounted in the latter half of his presidency, he relied on the
informal advisory group, now known as the Cabinet, even more. The
formal law—stated in Article II of the U.S. Constitution—had a gap or
shortcoming that Washington addressed on his own initiative and
ingenuity. Perhaps, in hindsight, Washington’s establishment of the
Cabinet as an informal advisory group seems banal, but, as Chervinsky’s
book shows, the Cabinet was not the only option Washington had
contemplated; for example, Washington considered, but ultimately
rejected consultations with the Senate or Supreme Court.279 Moreover, in
the beginning of his presidency, Washington stuck with the written
consultations with the department heads set forth in Article II of the
Constitution.280 But Washington ultimately found the formal governance
envisioned by the Constitution insufficient, especially in responding to
national crises.
c. Constitutionality of informal governance by presidents

The general practice of the President relying on informal advisers,
although not mentioned in the Constitution, is constitutional. The
Appointments Clause regulates the appointment of “Officers of the United
States” and “inferior Officers.”281 But it does not bar or preempt the use of
informal advisors in the federal government.282 As the D.C. Circuit
explained:
[T]he President[] [has the] capacity to solicit direct advice on any subject
related to his duties from a group of private citizens, separate from or
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
1993).

See id. at 5.
Id. at 164, 166–69.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Id.
See Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 908–09 (D.C. Cir.
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together with his closest governmental associates. That advice might be
sought on a broad range of issues in an informal or formal fashion.
Presidents have created advisory groups composed of private citizens
(sometimes in conjunction with government officials) to meet
periodically and advise them (hence the phrase “kitchen cabinets”) on
matters such as the conduct of a war. Presidents have even created formal
“cabinet committees” composed in part of private citizens.283

With the passage of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”)
in 1972, Congress has regulated how advisory committees with at least
one member who is not a federal employee operate.284 But there is nothing
in the Constitution that prohibits an informal advisor or ordinary citizen
providing assistance or input to the President or any other federal officer.
From the citizen’s perspective, such participation in government is a valid
exercise of self-governance, as discussed further below.
2. The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of power to the people
Outside of presidents relying on informal governance, a harder
question is whether informal governance by ordinary citizens or
government employees can be justified as a constitutional practice. The
President arguably has inherent power under Article II to rely on informal
governance not specifically set forth in the Constitution or federal laws.285
So, under the President’s inherent powers, Washington’s creation of a
Cabinet or reliance on informal governance does not violate the
Constitution. But what about ordinary citizens or government employees?
Can informal governance by citizens and government employees who are
not acting upon the President’s instruction be justified under the
Constitution? For example, neither the Wolverines nor the informal
election group were acting at the behest of President Trump. Can their
conduct and participation in informal governance be viewed as legitimate
under the Constitution?

283. Id. at 908.
284. See Federal Advisory Committee Management, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
https://www.doi.gov/execsec/faca (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
285. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,
he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore,
congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable,
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power
is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.”).
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One theory in favor of the constitutionality of such practices derives
from the concept of self-governance. The U.S. Constitution is hailed as the
embodiment of self-governance.286 As the Framers declared in the
preamble,
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.287

The Constitution established a republican form of government in which
citizens would decide their representatives and senators in Congress,
which the Constitution entrusts with enumerated, but limited, powers.288
As the Supreme Court has explained,
Madison prepared the Report in support of the protest. His premise was
that the Constitution created a form of government under which ‘The
people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty.’ The
structure of the government dispersed power in reflection of the people’s
distrust of concentrated power, and of power itself at all levels. This form
of government was ‘altogether different’ from the British form, under
which the Crown was sovereign and the people were subjects.289

The Ninth Amendment states: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.”290 The Tenth Amendment further states that “[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”291
It is not obvious under the Constitution what rights and powers are
reserved to the people. The Supreme Court has not clarified the issue,
largely ignoring “the people” and focusing instead on powers reserved to
the states in its Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.292 In dissents or

286. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132
(1991) (“Conventional wisdom acknowledges that the original Constitution proposed by the
Philadelphia convention focused primarily on issues of organizational structure and democratic selfgovernance . . . .”).
287. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
288. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular
Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 750–51 (1994).
289. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964).
290. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
291. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
292. See Jake Sullivan, The Tenth Amendment and Local Government, 112 YALE L.J. 1935,
1937 (2003).
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concurrences, Justice Thomas has provided his interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment’s reservation of power to either the states or the people:
In each State, the remainder of the people’s powers—”[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States,”Amdt. 10—are either delegated to the state government
or retained by the people. The Federal Constitution does not specify
which of these two possibilities obtains; it is up to the various state
constitutions to declare which powers the people of each State have
delegated to their state government.293

Although Justice Gorsuch appears to agree with Justice Thomas’s
interpretation, the Court has yet to squarely decide the meaning of “the
people” in the Tenth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment has fared even
worse, soliciting the Court’s avoidance.294 (The Supreme Court has also
interpreted the First Amendment’s right of the people “to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances” into a mere formality.295) Akhil
Amar contends that the references to “the people” in the preamble, and
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, as well as Article IV’s indirect reference to
the people, embody “first principles of popular sovereignty and self-rule
by the people.”296 These clauses are “embodiments of the Constitution’s
unitary structure and overarching spirit of popular sovereignty—of the
people’s right to ‘ordain’ and ‘establish,’ and their ‘reserved’ and ‘retained’
rights to alter or abolish, their Constitution” by a majority vote.297 Amar’s
focus is on the people’s right to change the Constitution.
My theory is that the references to “the people” in the Constitution—
including the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of “[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, … to the States respectively, or to the people”298—should be
interpreted to recognize the ability of ordinary citizens to participate in
293. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 847 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2333 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“When the
Constitution is silent, authority resides with the States or the people. This allocation of power is both
embodied in the structure of our Constitution and expressly required by the Tenth Amendment.”).
294. See Samuel J. Levine, Of Inkblots and Omnisignificance: Conceptualizing Secondary and
Symbolic Functions of the Ninth Amendment, in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 277, 280 (2009).
295. See John Inazu & Burt Neuborne, Right to Assemble and Petition, NAT’L CONST. CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-i/interps/267
(last
visited Mar. 27, 2022).
296. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Amar, supra note 288, at 760.
297. Amar, supra note 288, at 760. But see Brett W. King, Wild Political Dreaming: Historical
Context, Popular Sovereignty and Supermajority Rules, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 609 (2000) (disputing
the accuracy of Amar’s history and criticizing his theory).
298. See Sullivan, supra note 292, at 1941.

248

199]

Informal Governance of the United States

governance, without being elected, in areas not preempted by the
Constitution. In other words, a power reserved to the people under the
Tenth Amendment is the basic ability to engage in self-governance or to
participate in governance on matters not preempted by the Constitution,
whether at the national, state, or local level. Indeed, the power to engage
in self-governance might be characterized as the primordial power of the
people or the precondition that gave rise to the Constitution itself. Without
that basic power, the whole project of drafting and ratifying a new
constitution would be null and void. By ratifying the Constitution, the
people ceded limited powers to the federal government as enumerated in
the Constitution. But, as the Tenth Amendment recognizes, the people did
not thereby cede all of their powers to engage in self-governance. They
continue to hold the power to amend the Constitution, for example, as
Amar points out. And they continue to hold the power to participate in
governance in areas not preempted by the Constitution.
For example, Article II recognizes that the President shall give to
Congress the State of the Union and “recommend to their Consideration
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”299 This
responsibility requires the President to give the State of the Union, but it
does not preempt a citizen’s ability to deliver speeches, including before
Congress, describing the injustices or failings of the country and calling
for an amendment to the Constitution to recognize women’s right to
vote.300 By contrast, the President is the Commander in Chief.301 A military
officer (or a citizen) could not give the military an order that went against
an order by the President. That is an exclusive power the President holds
as Commander in Chief under the Constitution. Any order contrary to the
President’s order would be preempted. Since states have no power to
regulate at the national level, the Tenth Amendment protects citizens’
ability to participate in matters of national governance that are not
preempted by federal law. This power of the people extends to
participating in informal governance of the United States—situations
lacking written rules or formal positions.

299. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
300. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony calls for Women’s Suffrage, DIGITAL HISTORY (1884),
https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=1064; Address of Susan B.
Anthony (1872), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/anthony/anthonyaddress.html.
301. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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3. Revisiting informal governance by the Wolverines and informal
election group
If we apply this constitutional theory to the two case studies, both
examples of informal governance can be justified as self-governance.
First, the Wolverines involved a mix of federal employees, a state
employee, and members from the private sector, academia, and nonprofits.
The informal group can be described as an advisory group that provided
guidance to other members of the federal government and the state of
California. Although they were not established by President Trump, their
original formation traces back to President Bush’s Administration.
Members of the Trump administration reportedly sat in on some of the
Wolverines’ phone meetings. Under my interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment, this kind of informal advisory group is a valid exercise of
self-governance. Although the CDC has statutory authority to deal with
infectious diseases and protect America from public health threats, neither
the CDC nor the federal government has exclusive authority in this area.302
Importantly, the states have broad authority to handle public health threats
within their borders.303 Moreover, even within the federal government,
multiple actors are involved in addressing public health concerns (e.g.,
NIH, Surgeon General, DHHS, Homeland Security). If the Wolverines had
been a nonprofit organization, there would be nothing constitutionally
suspect about their development of a strategy for social interventions
during a pandemic.304 The fact that some of the members of the informal
group were federal employees does not alter the analysis. The group’s
recommended strategy of social interventions did not contradict the CDC
guidance or any order of the President.
Likewise, the informal election group contributed funding for election
administration in the states, tool kits for enabling voting during the
pandemic, public service announcements, and other measures to protect
the integrity of the election and the result. The Constitution does not
preclude citizens from getting involved in this electoral process. Indeed,
participation in helping to secure the integrity of an election arguably is
one of the most important contributions citizens can make. Moreover,
302. See Katye M. Jobe, Comment, The Constitutionality of Quarantine and Isolation Orders
in an Ebola Epidemic and Beyond, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 165, 179 (2016); James J. Misrahi, The
CDC’s Communicable Disease Regulations: Striking the Balance Between Public Health & Individual
Rights, 67 EMORY L.J. 463, 466 (2018).
303. See Jobe, supra note 302, at 174–76.
304. I put aside the question whether the Wolverines fall within FACA and should have been
subject to its statutory requirements.

250

199]

Informal Governance of the United States

because the Constitution leaves unregulated the practice of whether a
losing candidate concedes, the efforts of the informal election group to
convince the losing candidate to follow the tradition of giving a concession
filled a gap left open by the Constitution and federal law. The group’s
provision of additional funding for election administration and safety
precautions during the pandemic can also be viewed as filling the gaps
created by the balkanized system of voting among the states that is created
by the Constitution.

III. P OTENTIAL A BUSES AND C ONCERNS WITH I NFORMAL
G OVERNANCE
Even if participation in informal governance is a reserved power of
the people under the Tenth Amendment or otherwise constitutionally
permissible, informal governance, like formal governance, is not immune
from corruption or abuses. Part III describes several potential abuses that
informal governance may enable.
A. Rogue Operations, Corruption, and a Shadow Government
The worst-case scenario is that informal governance involves
corruption or even illegality. Fears of backdoor deals, black bag or rogue
operations, and a shadow government lurk in the background of informal
governance. The Basel Institute on Governance, University College
London, and SOAS studied how corruption occurred in seven developing
countries in East Africa and Eurasia, where the written laws were routinely
ignored in favor of “mostly unwritten and rarely openly articulated”
practices involving corruption.305 As the Basel Institute concluded: “The
research uncovered the centrality of informal social networks that operate
at all levels, linking up political elites, business interests and ordinary
citizens. The practices of the networks are associated with the prevalence
of high levels of corruption but are also useful to ‘get things done’ and as
a result become entrenched.”306 Informal governance can operate as a dualedged sword—as an innovative way to address intractable problems that

305. See Informal Governance, BASEL INST. ON GOVERNANCE, https://baselgovernance.org
/public-governance/research-projects/informal-governance (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
306. About informal governance, BASEL INSTITUTE OF GOVERNANCE, https://baselgovernance.
org/public-governance/research-projects/informal-governance/about-informal-governance
(last
visited Mar. 27, 2022).
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escape solutions by traditional governments, but also as device for
corruption or skirting the law without public scrutiny.307
Whether corruption through informal governance is diminished in an
advanced country like the United States, with its long tradition of written
laws and the rule of law, is hard to determine. History suggests not. The
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA)
are notorious for carrying out “black bag” and clandestine operations,
including the massive surveillance program (PRISM) disclosed by Edward
Snowden that captured the emails and metadata of U.S. citizens.308 The
PRISM surveillance program was clandestine and carried out via
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, AOL, Skype, and Apple,309
unbeknownst to their users, but it had been approved by the secret Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court under an expansive reading of the FISA
Amendments Act.310 Therefore, technically speaking, PRISM was not
informal governance because the government had putative legal authority
to conduct its clandestine operation under written law. After Snowden’s
disclosure of PRISM, the NSA reportedly ceased the program,311 and
Congress amended FISA to prohibit bulk collection of phone metadata
after Nov. 28, 2025.312 In 2020, the Ninth Circuit ruled that PRISM’s
collection of telephone metadata of U.S. citizens violated FISA and may
have also violated the Fourth Amendment.313 Notwithstanding the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in 2020, I would still classify the NSA’s PRISM program
as formal governance since it was instituted under the putative authority
of a statute and had the approval of the FISA Court. Had there been no
plausible statutory basis for PRISM and no court approval, the operation
307. See Ayres, supra note 30, at 90 (“On the one hand, informal governance can assist in
solving political and policy problems which cannot easily be solved by traditional government
institutions, leading to more effective and innovative decision-making. On the other, it may weaken
transparency, accountability and legitimacy by undermining traditional (more formal) administrative
structures.”) (citation omitted).
308. See Juli Weiner, Edward Snowden Shares $52.6 Billion Intelligence “Black Budget” with
the Washington Post, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2013/08/
edward-snowden-shares-52-6-billion-intelligence-black-budget-with-the-washington-post.
309. See Dan Seifert, Secret Program Gives NSA, FBI Backdoor Access to Apple, Google,
Facebook, Microsoft Data, THE VERGE (June 6, 2013, 6:04 PM), https://www.theverge.com
/2013/6/6/4403868/nsa-fbi-mine-data-apple-google-facebook-microsoft-others-prism.
310. See Are They Allowed to Do That? A Breakdown of Selected Government Surveillance
Programs, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 15, 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/
files/analysis/Government%20Surveillance%20Factsheet.pdf.
311. See Charlie Savage, Disputed N.S.A. Phone Program Is Shut Down, Aide Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/politics/nsa-phone-records-program-shutdown.html.
312. USA Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861).
313. See United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 992–93, 996 (9th Cir. 2020).
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could be considered informal governance (not to mention a rogue
operation).
A clearer example of informal governance that led to corruption was
the Iran-Contra affair during the Reagan Administration: National Security
Adviser Robert McFarlane and other officials concocted a scheme to sell
arms to Iran in an effort to get the return of seven American hostages held
by Iranian terrorists in Lebanon.314 In contravention of U.S. law,
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North of the National Security Council diverted
$18 million of the funds from the arms sale to Iran to provide support to
the Contras, who were fighting the Cuban-backed Sandinistas in
Nicaragua.315 After the illegal operation became known, Congress
investigated the operation and concluded that several federal laws were
violated, including the Constitution: “That operation, known as ‘The
Enterprise,’ was contrary to the Constitution and ‘the decision to use the
Enterprise to fight a war with unappropriated funds was a decision to
combine the power of the purse and the power of the sword in one branch
of government.’”316
More recently, in July 2021, a Senate investigation found that the
Commerce Department’s Investigations and Threat Management Service
(ITMS) had operated as “a rogue, unaccountable police force” outside of
its statutory authority, targeting Asian-American employees.317 The Senate
report described what can be classified as an informal governance
arrangement, with the lack of written policies or procedures by which
ITMS operated:
For nearly sixteen years, abuse of the Special Deputation program
involved engagement in a variety of criminal and counterintelligence
investigations, including ancillary activities like permitting agents to
carry firearms, monitor electronic and wire communications, and
conduct warrantless searches of office space and personal lockers on
Department grounds. The unit even maintained a database to store
information on foreign nationals and U.S. citizens.

314. See The Iran-Contra Affair, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features
/reagan-iran/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2021).
315. Id.
316. See Judi Hasson, Iran-Contra Report: At Least Four Laws Broken, UPI (Nov. 18, 1987),
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/11/18/Iran-Contra-report-at-least-four-lawsbroken/9088564210000/
317. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON COM. SCI. & TRANSP., COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION REPORT:
ABUSE AND MISCONDUCT AT THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, 4 (July 2021) [hereinafter REPORT ON
MISCONDUCT].
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In addition, the unit lacked internal policies defining the scope of its
investigative authorities for most of its existence, which allowed it to
become what whistleblowers described as a “gestapo.”318

The lack of internal policies and procedures, along with the lack of
recordkeeping of its investigations, led to many abuses over sixteen
years.319 As the Senate report concluded: “For sixteen years, the
Investigations and Threat Management Service operated within the
Department of Commerce without proper authority or meaningful
oversight. The unit regularly disregarded the rule of law, committing gross
abuses of power and misusing taxpayer funds to perform missions the unit
lacked authorization to undertake.”320 Although the same abuses could
have occurred even if the unit had written policies or rules in place, the
absence of such policies may have made it easier for members to do
whatever they wanted—to go rogue.
B. Other Concerns
Even when informal governance does not break the law or involve
outright corruption, it can raise problems for democracy. The two most
salient problems are the lack of transparency and lack of accountability, as
discussed below. It is difficult for people to know even when informal
governance is occurring, much less what it entails. For example, without
the Lewis book and Time Magazine article, it seems doubtful the public
would have had any information about the work of the Wolverines and the
informal election group. One might suspect that many other instances of
informal governance occur in the United States without public knowledge
or scrutiny.
1. Lack of transparency
When informal governance operates completely in secret, it runs
counter to an open democracy. For self-governance to work, citizens need
to know what the government is doing to evaluate the policies and conduct
of their officials. As Madison famously wrote: “A popular government,
without popular information, or the means of requiring it, is but Prologue

318. Id. at 7.
319. Id. See also Catie Edmondson, ‘Rogue’ U.S. Agency Used Racial Profiling to Investigate
Commerce Dept. Employees, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com
/2021/07/16/us/politics/commerce-department-senate- report.html.
320. REPORT ON MISCONDUCT, supra note 317, at 36.
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to a Farce or a Tragedy, or, perhaps, both.”321 Of course, the inner workings
of the White House, administrative agencies, and congressional offices are
not generally open to the public (although the President and agencies are
subject to public records laws). So it is facile to think that the public is
entitled to access or know everything involving governance that happens
behind closed doors. Indeed, Madison and the Framers drafted the
Constitution in secret proceedings.322
2. Lack of accountability
Related to the lack of transparency is the problem of lack of
accountability. Informal governance may involve interactions in which the
authority for the conduct undertaken is ambiguous. Moreover, the loose
networks and lack of formal oversight in informal governance situations
may make it hard to identify who (if anyone) is responsible for what.
Instead of a formal governance structure, such as an administrative agency
with an official head, an informal group or network diffuses or deflects
accountability.
C. Evaluation of Two Case Studies
If we scrutinize the informal groups discussed in the two case studies,
some of the above concerns seem relevant.
It does not appear that either group was involved in any corruption.
The Wolverines advanced a novel view of what they believed was the right
public health strategy involving social interventions to fight the pandemic
based on the prior, published research of Mecher and Hatchett.323 The
Wolverines presented their views to the CDC, members of the Trump
Administration and other federal agencies, and Governor Newsom, but the
Wolverines were not responsible for making the decisions of the CDC,
Trump Administration, or state of California. Although some Republicans
and Trump supporters still disagree with the use of social interventions,
the disagreement over policy is not evidence of corruption. Likewise, the
informal election group helped to secure private donations for election

321. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON,
COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING NUMEROUS
LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED 1819–1836, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1910).
322. See Transparency, within reason, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (MAR. 14, 2005),
https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/transparency-within-reason.
323. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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administration during the pandemic and organized public service
announcements and public responses from various groups that were meant
to preserve the integrity of the elections and respect for the election results.
A tougher question is whether the Wolverines should be classified as
an advisory committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) and, therefore, have been subject to the “administrative guidelines
and management controls for advisory committees established by [the
relevant] agency,” here, presumably DHHS or the CDC.324 Based on my
reading of the Lewis account, the Wolverines were not officially treated as
such, although I cannot rule out the possibility they were. FACA defines
“advisory committee” broadly:
The term “advisory committee” means any committee, board,
commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar
group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof (hereafter in this
paragraph referred to as “committee”), which is—
(A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or
(B) established or utilized by the President, or
(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of
obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or
more agencies or officers of the Federal Government, except that
such term excludes (i) any committee that is composed wholly of
full-time, or permanent part-time, officers or employees of the
Federal Government, and
(D) any committee that is created by the National Academy of Sciences
or the National Academy of Public Administration.325

Since Trump didn’t establish the Wolverines, it cannot be considered a
Presidential advisory committee. Instead, the question is whether the
group was an agency advisory committee for DHHS, CDC, or Homeland
Security. Arguably, the Wolverines were at least “utilized by one or more
agencies” for the group’s recommendations on social interventions. The
group evolved on its own from prior relationships starting with work in
the Bush White House, so it would be harder to say it was “established”
by a federal agency. Because several members were not federal employees
at the time, the Wolverines do not fall within the exception for “any
committee that is composed wholly of full- time, or permanent part-time,
officers or employees of the Federal Government.”

324. 5a U.S.C. § 8(a).
325. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5a U.S.C. § 3(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
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At least from the Time article, the informal election group did not
provide recommendations to a federal agency. Instead, the group provided
guidance to secretaries of state and local election officials, who are not
regulated by FACA.326
Nonetheless, for both the Wolverines and the informal election group,
it is worth asking whether there should have been greater transparency of
the groups contemporaneous to the activities they engaged in. People may
have differing views in answering that question. The Wolverines chose to
work largely behind the scenes to convince the actual decisionmakers of
the best strategy to stop the spread of COVID. They predicted, in early
January 2020, how quickly the virus would spread, including through
asymptomatic infection.327 It is impossible to know if the outcome would
have been significantly different or better for the United States if members
of the group attempted to speak publicly about their views in January 2020.
But, for the federal employees in the group, they would not likely have
been authorized to make such public statements. The efforts of the
informal election group were often public and are, in any event, less
problematic because, unlike the situation with the CDC and President’s
coronavirus task force, there was no agency tasked with trying to convince
candidates or the public to respect the election results.

IV. M EASURES TO M AKE I NFORMAL G OVERNANCE M ORE
A CCOUNTABLE
Part IV proposes some measures to make informal governance more
accountable. Short of converting informal governance into formal
governance structures, subject to written rules and procedures, the
challenge is to figure out ways that foster the benefits of informal
governance— innovation and problem-solving—while adding safeguards
to reduce the risk of corruption.
A. Ethics, Nonpartisanship, and the Common Good
The starting point for reducing corruption lies in the ethics of the
people involved, a basic ingredient for both formal and informal
governance. In today’s highly polarized climate, perhaps relying on ethics
sounds Pollyannish. But there is simply no way around the need for ethics
among those involved in governance situations. Any political system or
326. See Ball, supra note 15.
327. See LEWIS, supra note 5, at 166–70.
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structure, formal or informal, can be corrupted if the people involved are
corrupt. As Madison wrote:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain
for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to
pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take
the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they
continue to hold their public trust.328

The notion of pursuing “the common good of the society” might sound
quaint, but political theorists have long recognized its importance to
governance.329 Of course, ethics are no guarantee to prevent abuses of
informal government. Especially with complex problems that require
immediate action, people may not have the luxury of time to figure out all
the ethical and legal nuances of their work.
Likewise, the ability to act in a nonpartisan or at least bipartisan
manner when considering the common good of society is an important
trait. Indeed, it may be worthwhile for the group to discuss the importance
of nonpartisanship and agree to abide by a principle of nonpartisanship in
their work.330 There may be some situations of governance where acting
in a partisan manner may not be troubling, but, often, partisan politics may
get in the way of acting for the common good. For example, just imagine
the Wolverines were all Republicans, and they only worried about the
health of Republicans, especially in red states. If Democrats were infected
by the coronavirus, the group simply didn’t care—or, even worse, were
fine with more Democrats getting infected and dying. Instead of basing its
pandemic strategy on science, imagine the group let partisan politics shape
its pandemic recommendations. This hypothetical example sounds
horrific, but some press accounts have indicated the Trump White House
may have done exactly that when COVID initially affected people in
traditionally Democratic states more so than in Republican states in
2020.331 By contrast, by Lewis’s account, the Wolverines did not act in a
328. FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 57 (1776) (Madison).
329. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, 79
(1862) (citizen is “called upon . . . to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting
claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims
which have for their reason of existence the common good”); James T. Kloppenburg, To Promote the
General Welfare: Why Madison Matters, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 357, 359 (2019) (discussing
Rousseau’s theory of general will that informed Madison, Wilson, and framers of Constitution in their
understanding of common good).
330. Cf. Lee, supra note 46, at 1024–28.
331. See Matt Stieb, Trump’s Disregard for Blue States Is at the Heart of His Shoddy COVID
Response, NEW YORK (July 31, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/07/trumps-war-on-bluestates-is-worse-than-previously-thought.html.
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political or partisan manner. Instead, they were trying to develop a strategy
for the good of the United States from a medical standpoint. All the
original Wolverines had U.S. military or government service.332 Beyond
that experience, all were physicians subject to professional ethical
responsibilities, including “special obligations to all my fellow human
beings, those sound of mind and body as well as the infirm.”333 The
individual’s personal ethics and character can provide an internal check
against corruption.
B. Channeling to Other Decisionmakers Who Are Democratically
Accountable
As Madison recognized, it is also important “to take the most effectual
precautions for keeping [people] virtuous whilst they continue to hold their
public trust.”334 During the drafting of the Constitution, Madison was most
concerned about the formal structures of the federal government. The same
concern can be applied to informal governance. The challenge is figuring
out safeguards that do not convert informal governance into formal
governance at the risk of losing the benefits of innovation that informal
governance may yield.
One safeguard is removing the ultimate decision-making power from
informal governance. In other words, informal governance can develop
and propose policies, and organize fundraising, but the ultimate decisions
on whether to adopt such policies or how to use such funds should be left
to officials who are a part of formal governance and who are subject to
written rules or procedures. One might describe this arrangement as
informal governance that ultimately filters or channels through formal
governance. There is, in other words, a formal check on informal
governance when the ultimate decision lies in the hands of officials who
are democratically accountable, as was the case with the Cabinet to
President Washington. Likewise, the Wolverines developed a
recommended policy of social interventions to fight the coronavirus, but
their recommendations had to be filtered through the CDC and the Trump
Administration at the federal level and through Gov. Newsom’s
Administration for the state of California. Similarly, the informal election
group presented guidance on voting during the pandemic to secretaries of

332. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
333. Medical Definition of Hippocratic Oath, MEDICINENET, https://www.medicinenet.com/
hippocratic_oath/definition.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
334. FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 57 (1776) (Madison).
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state and local election officials. The election group’s enlisting of
nonprofit organizations for public service announcements had its own
external check: federal law prohibiting tax exempt nonprofits from
engaging in political campaigns.335
Eventually, the informal governance structure can be made formal, as
with Obama’s creation of the U.S. Digital Service.336 But one fear in
institutionalizing a practice that operated as informal governance in the
past is losing the flexibility and innovativeness of informal governance.
C. Scrutiny: Internal Review, Outside Audits, and Transparency Reports
Another check that may mitigate some of the concerns about the lack
of transparency associated with informal governance is the inclusion of an
opportunity for review of an informal group’s work. The review could be
an internal review (e.g., by a third-party in the same agency but not a part
of the informal group), an outside audit (e.g., by an outside entity or
experts in the relevant field),337 or public disclosure of their work. Groups
involved in informal governance can even publish their own transparency
report detailing their work. Some of the nonprofit organizations involved
in efforts organized by the informal election group have published
summaries of their election work on their websites.338 Just as in the case
of agreeing to a principle of nonpartisanship, an informal group would be
well-served by discussing what form of review it should adopt as a means
of ensuring accountability of the group.
Notably, both the Wolverines and the informal election group publicly
disclosed their work in interviews by the authors of the book and magazine
article that detailed their work. Indeed, the Time Magazine article indicates
that some members of the informal election group felt it was important
that the American people know what the group did and realize that
“[d]emocracy is not self-executing.”339 Likewise, when Lewis’s book was
published, key members of the Wolverines also sat down for interviews

335. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 43–45.
337. Cf. LAURA W. MURPHY, FACEBOOK’S CIVIL RIGHTS AUDIT – FINAL REPORT (July 8, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Civil-Rights-Audit-Final-Report.pdf.
338. See, e.g., supra note 252 and accompanying text (Issue One’s discussion of election
efforts); The Associated Press Election Transparency Project, PROTECT DEMOCRACY,
https://protectdemocracy.org/project/the-associated-press-election-transparency-project/ (last visited
Mar. 27, 2022).
339. Ball, supra note 15 (quoting Ian Bassin, co-founder of Protect Democracy).
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with 60 Minutes.340 These publications have enabled others, myself
included, to scrutinize the groups’ work. Although any reviews are too late
to change the past work of these groups, the reviews can provide
invaluable guidance for future work of the groups and any others who
engage in informal governance of the United States.

C ONCLUSION
The United States is known for its Constitution and adherence to the
rule of law. Typically, this arrangement is understood in a formalist way,
which prizes written laws and clearly prescribed regulations and sources
of authority. Yet the Constitution and federal laws do not explain the
various ways in which people can participate in informal governance
situations that are not expressly authorized by any law, but that shape,
sometimes in profound ways, the national policies and governance of the
United States. President George Washington’s creation and reliance on a
Cabinet, nowhere mentioned in the Constitution or then federal law,
provides an early example of such informal governance Washington used
to respond to national crises, including potential war and domestic
insurrection. To better understand informal governance of the United
States, this Article examines two recent examples of informal governance
during the COVID pandemic and 2020 U.S. election. The Article sets forth
a theory to justify citizens’ engagement in informal governance as a form
of self-governance reserved to the people under the Tenth Amendment.
However, given the possibility for abuses and corruption in informal
governance, which lacks written rules or laws authorizing or regulating
such activities, the Article recommends the adoption of several checks to
reduce the possibility of corruption. In this way, informal governance can
operate with greater safeguards without sacrificing the innovation and
advantages it offers in addressing intractable problems of the twenty-first
century.

340. See John Dickerson, Doctors, Scientists Who Warned Officials About Oncoming Pandemic
Focus of New Michael Lewis Book, 60 MINUTES (May 2, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news
/michael-lewis-premonition-60-minutes-2021-05-02/.
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